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In the last few years, communities of services have been studied in a certain num-
bers of proposals as virtual pockets of similar expertise. The motivation is to provide these
services with high chance of discovery through better visibility, and to enhance their ca-
pabilities when it comes to provide requested functionalities. There are some proposed
mechanisms and models on aggregating web services and making them cooperate within
their communities. However, forming optimal and stable communities as coalitions to max-
imize individual and group efficiency and income for all the involved parties has not been
addressed yet. Moreover, in the proposed frameworks of these communities, a common as-
sumption is that residing services, which are supposed to be autonomous and intelligent, are
competing over received requests. However, those services can also exhibit cooperative be-
haviors, for instance in terms of substituting each other. When competitive and cooperative
behaviors and strategies are combined, autonomous services are said to be “coopetitive”.
Deciding to compete or cooperate inside communities is a problem yet to be investigated.
In this thesis, we first identify the problem of defining efficient algorithms for coali-
tion formation mechanisms. We study the community formation problem in two different
settings: 1) communities with centralized manager having complete information using co-
operative game-theoretic techniques; and 2) communities with distributed decision making
mechanisms having incomplete information using training methods. We propose mecha-
nisms for community membership requests and selections of web services in the scenarios
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where there is interaction between one community and many web services and scenarios
where web services can join multiple established communities. Then in order to address
the coopetitive relation within communities of web services, we propose a decision making
mechanism for our web services to efficiently choose competition or cooperation strategies
to maximize their payoffs. We prove that the proposed decision mechanism is efficient
and can be implemented in time linear in the length of the time period considered for the
analysis and the number of services in the community. Moreover, we conduct extensive
simulations, analyze various scenarios, and confirm the obtained theoretical results using
parameters from a real web services dataset.
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In this chapter, we introduce the context of this research, which is about communities of
web services abstracted as autonomous agents. Those agent-based web services use intelli-
gent decision making mechanisms to improve their performance in multi-agent setting. We
discuss the motivations of this work and briefly review the literature to identify the problems
we aim to solve in this thesis. Moreover, we discuss our objectives and contributions.
1.1 Context of Research
Over the past years, online services have become part of many scalable business applica-
tions. The increasing reliance on web-based applications has significantly influenced the
way web services are engineered. Web services provide a set of online software functions
accessible at a network address over the web. The recent developments are shifting web
services from passive and individual components to autonomous and group-based compo-
nents where interaction, composition, and cooperation are the key challenges [69, 16]. The
main objective is to achieve a seamless integration of business processes, applications and
web services. Delivering high quality services considering the dynamic and unpredictable
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nature of the Internet is still a very critical and challenging issue.
Typically, web services are business applications deployed as autonomous and inter-
operable agents [49]. In fact, the W3C consortium defines a web service as “an abstract
notion that must be implemented by a concrete agent”. However, the web is stocked with
agent-based services that offer similar business functionalities, which leads to service con-
sumers having difficulties in choosing the most appropriate agents to interact with.
The need for highly available and responsive services has called for grouping and col-
laborative mechanisms of loosely-coupled web services, particularly in business settings.
The idea of grouping web services within communities and the way those communities are
engineered so that web services can better collaborate have been proposed and investigated
in [53, 14, 71]. Communities are virtual groups of web services having similar functionali-
ties [89, 66, 59, 52], but probably different non-functional quality attributes, which form the
QoS parameters. Communities aim to provide higher service availability and performance
than what individual web services can provide.
1.2 Motivating Scenario
In this section, we present a scenario and demonstrate why there is need for communities of
services. We first propose an example of a real world scenario, focusing on user experience.
There are a plethora of options available to people in today’s society, including weather
forecasting, ticketing services, map services, local places guides and so on. Most mobile or
web applications cannot independently satisfy users requests and should rely on different
online services. The high competition within the services industry requires applications to
use reliable and high quality online services.
If the user were to check a web site or run an application on her mobile device upon
having downtime, or having high response delay or encountering any non-satisfying quality
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metric, she will instantly remove the application, which is a huge business concern for ap-
plication providers. For example, if a user installs a ticketing application on her mobile de-
vice and the application is not using high quality service providers, the user would instantly
uninstall the application, which has an extremely negative impact on the visibility of the
application. Thus, end user satisfaction is the main goal for competitive online providers.
Communities of web service, by providing services with higher quality, higher uptime and
reliability for end users, aim to reach this goal. To this end, community management de-
cisions should capitalize on important QoS parameters while forming the community and
during membership management.
High demand on online services has created a massive business competition. For ex-
ample, nowadays users are provided with multiple choices of web services offering local
places information such as coffees, venues, and shops nearby a geographic position. It is
hard for new web services to find their customers and be visible for end users amongst hun-
dreds or thousands of other available services, even if they provide a high quality of service.
Hence, the concept of communities of web services provides them with the chance of join-
ing a platform with an established market share and reputation. However, it is crucial for
a community manager to consider many factors when inviting or accepting new members.
For example, if the market share is not big enough, bringing new web services can cause
revenue drop for the already residing members. This may encourage other web services to
collude, leave, or join other communities, hurting the community stability. This is an impor-
tant issue which has not been addressed previously in the relevant literature. On the other
hand, if communities bound the number of web services to ensure higher revenue, availabil-
ity and response time could be negatively affected if some members encounter problems.
This is because alternative web services for substitution will be limited. This has also not
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been efficiently addressed in the related work. Consequently, community formation algo-
rithms satisfying some desirable properties such as community stability and overall revenue
are yet to be defined considering end users, community managers and service providers.
1.3 Problem and Research Questions
Web services communities are dynamic by design [53]. In these communities, web services
are modeled as intelligent autonomous agents, where they can adopt a strategy maximizing
their payoff at any time. A web service can ask joining a community and has the right to
leave it. Community managers can invite or ask a web service to leave in order to maxi-
mize the community profit. Users can simply stop sending requests to a web service which
is not providing satisfactory services. Thus, it is important to consider all the parties in-
volved in the decision making process about the community formation and management.
Most of the recent work on communities of services are either user-centric and focus on
user satisfaction [23] or system-centric and focus on the whole system throughput, perfor-
mance and utilization. There are many contributions in distributed, grid, cluster and cloud
services which are system-centric. However, in real world environments and applications,
both users and service providers are self-interested agents, aiming to maximize their own
profit. In those environments, both parties (users and services) will collaborate as long as
they are getting more benefits and profit. Our initial research question is:
How can we model the community of agent-based services in order to maximize the profit
of involved users, web services and community organizers? [R1]
In order to address this problem, recently [46, 41, 48] proposed mechanisms to help
users and services maximize their gain. A two-player non-cooperative game between web
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services and community master (i.e., manager) was introduced in [41]. In [46], a 3-way
satisfaction approach for selecting web services has been proposed. In this approach, the
authors proposed a web service selection process that the community masters can use. The
approach considers the efficiency of all the three involved parties, namely users, web ser-
vices and communities. The issue with these solution concepts is that they consider com-
munity as a whole and model it as one entity in their formulations. A community master
decides on behalf of all the members using an aggregated function of parameters. This can
hurt the overall revenue for some individual web services, or even a subset of web services.
Those services can collude and form their own community to increase their payoff, instead
of having to adjust and share their resources with other members. Another important issue
which needs to be considered is the community stability. In community of web services,
the members and community organizers collaborate to perform tasks. Having jointly com-
pleted a task and generated revenue, they need to agree on some reasonable method of
dividing profits (or tasks) among themselves. This is a key issue for the group stability still
to be investigated. If the revenue sharing mechanism is not fair enough for any subset of
web services working in the community, these agents, as profit maximizing entities, would
deviate and make their own group. Thus, an important an important research question that
we would like to address is:
How can we model fair and stable communities as coalitions of agent-based web services?
[R2]
In [48], a cooperative scheme among autonomous web services based on coalitional
game theory has been introduced. The authors have proposed an algorithm to reach individ-
ually stable coalition partition for web services in order to maximize their efficiency. The
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communities choose new web services on the promise that it would benefit the community
without decreasing any other web service’s income. In their model, the worth of community
is evaluated with high emphasis on the availability metric and considering price and cost
values only. The community structure is based on a coordination chain, where a web ser-
vice is assigned as a primary web service and the community task distribution method will
initially invoke the primary web service. Only if the primary web service is unavailable,
the next backup web services in the ordered coordination chain will be invoked. However,
in cooperative models, it is preferred to have a real and active cooperative activity engaging
all agents to perform the tasks more efficiently. Thus, the final research question we aim to
investigate is:
How can we model and analyze the cooperation among the community members in re-
alistic, applicable and practical settings? [R3]
In most of the recent work on communities of web service, the solutions consider the
architecture of centralized management for communities where most of the decisions are
made by the centralized coordinator. However, in real world scenarios, decisions made by
independent service providers are highly distributed.
How can we model a distributed decision making process for the problem of forming com-
munities of services? [R4]
Also in all of the mentioned proposals, the community manager as a centralized en-
tity, has complete information of all the web services and their quality. However, centrality
and complete information are strong assumptions, which are not fully compatible with real
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business scenarios.
How can we make web services operate efficiently based on limited information? [R5]
Within communities, services can exhibit competitive behavior as they provide the
same functionalities and the number of users requests is finite. However, for the same rea-
son of being functionally similar, services can cooperate with each other, for example to
substitute each other in order to perform some sub-tasks. For instance, services can opt for
performing tasks if they feel they are capable enough or decide to cooperate by showing the
availability to perform some sub-tasks. The relevant question to be addressed is:
How can we design a community model where both competitive and cooperative behav-
iors exist? [R6]
1.4 Contributions
1.4.1 Contribution 1: Efficient Coalition Formation for Web Services
In this research work1, our first objective is to propose a cooperative model as game for the
aggregation of web services within communities. The solution concepts of our cooperative
game seeks to find efficient ways of forming coalitions (teams) of web services so that they
can maximize their gain and payoff, and distribute the gain in a fair way among all the
member services. Achieving fairness when the gain is distributed among the community
members is the main factor to keep the coalition stable as no web service will expect to
gain better by deviating from the community. In other words, the coalition is made efficient
1This contribution was published in [8]
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if all the members are satisfied. We first propose a representation function for communi-
ties of web services based on their QoS attributes. By using this function, we can evaluate
the worth of each community of web services. When facing new membership requests, a
typical community master checks whether the new coalition having the old and new set of
web services will keep the community stable or not. The community master will reject the
membership requests if it finds out that the new coalition would be unstable, preventing any
subset of web services from gaining significantly more by deviating from the community
and joining other communities or forming new ones. The computation of solutions for co-
operative games is combinatorial in nature and proven to be NP-complete [27], making this
computation impractical in scalable real world applications. However, using the concepts
of coalition stability, the second objective is to investigate approximation algorithms run-
ning in polynomial time providing web services and community masters with applicable
and near-optimal decision making mechanisms.
1.4.2 Contribution 2: Distributed Decision Making for Dynamic For-
mation of Web Services Communities
In order to address the centralized decision making process limitations and adopt a dis-
tributed decision making approach, we introduce DDM2, a Distributed Decision Making
model for community formation. DDM regulates web service agents’ decision making pro-
cess in terms of cooperating and deciding which group to join and which service to invite
for joining. Unlike existing work on community formation, our decision model is extracted
from a data model in the form of information obtained from a large number of web services
regarding their single and cooperative utilities as well as environmental parameters such as
demand, service quality, etc. The generated decision tree improves agents’ understanding
2This contribution is submitted to International Journal of Decision Support Systems
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of the environment and and helps them select actions that lead towards maximizing their
utilities. The advantage of this approach is that the tree, which is initially created from
the past data, reflects a comprehensive vision about agents’ attitudes in terms of their ac-
tion selection based on their past experiences. Moreover, the tree is getting continuously
updated based on both new received feedback and the outcome of chosen actions. This
continuous update makes the approach adaptable to any change in the environment. The
decision model provides web services with enough information which helps those services
efficiently decide and predict the outcome of their different possible collaborations. This
model works in a distributed manner in which services are self-sufficient in their decision
making and do not rely on a centralized decision making process. Our findings show that
communities of web services can efficiently find the appropriate web service to invite for
cooperation as well as allowing a single web service to find the best communities to join.
The proposed model can be seen as a recommneder system that suggests beneficial actions
for both communities and single services. Communities can consider the decision model
and analyze the characteristics of different individual web services and make prudent deci-
sions when inviting a web service to join or accepting a join inquiry initiated from a web
service. In general, DDM equips web services with efficient methods for foreseeing how
their choices will impact both their short-term and long-term goals; therefore, opting for
the best decision available.
To effectively generate the decision model for web services, we used a real dataset to
extract web services’ individual characteristics and used them to measure outcomes when
these services cooperate with one another. The dataset has been extracted from real-world
QoS evaluation results from 142 users on 4,532 Web services during 64 different time slots.
Combining the available data based on each web service point of view on different time
slots, we acquired 5 different unique features for those 4,532 web services. By engineering
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and extracting these features, we gathered functional and cooperative features for both in-
dividual web services and communities in different time slots. We were able to investigate
the path a web service might take to achieve the best utility out of effective interactions
with others. All the paths and outcomes are labeled to be utilized in the training model.
Using cross validation sets, web services are able to compute the optimal hypothesis func-
tion (using logistic regression) that can be used to predict outcomes of cooperative work
with other individual web services or communities. Our findings show that web services
equipped with DDM have by far better outcomes than the ones that either do not cooperate
or randomly find communities to join.
1.4.3 Contribution 3: Analyzing Coopetition Strategies of Services within
Communities
In the previous contributions, our focus was on community formation and we emphasized
cooperative behavior of the web services as agents. In our next contribution3 our focus is on
the internal management affairs of communities of web services. Within communities, the
web services, selfish and utility maximizers by nature, can follow two different strategies,
namely cooperation and competition in order to increase their payoffs when they provide
services to consumers [50]. When competitive and cooperative behaviors and strategies are
combined, autonomous services are said to be “coopetitive”. In typical business settings,
services are used to compete within communities as they provide the same functionalities
and the number of users requests is finite. However, the same reason of providing similar
functionalities can lead services to cooperate because they can replace each other in case
of failure or unavailability, and services can do better in a coalition structure. Analyzing
3This contribution was published in [7]
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services competition and cooperation strategies within communities is still an open prob-
lem that motivates the research described in this section. we propose a mechanism within
which service agents in the community could choose either to compete for an announced
task4, or to cooperate with other competing services in the same community to accomplish
some subtasks of the announced task. We equip intelligent web services to follow a reason-
ing technique to choose best interactive strategy (Coopetitive attitude, which is categorized
to compete and cooperate). In the proposed system, We explore details behind the strate-
gic decision making procedures and enable service agents to apply different techniques to
constrain high efficiency and obtain the maximum utility. We investigate services’ expected
payoffs and the involved probabilities that are used to choose over the two interacting strate-
gies.
To summarize, the main problem we aim to tackle in this thesis is the formation of
stable and efficient coalitions maximizing web services and community revenue. The main
objectives are:
• To propose a cooperative model and analyze its solution concepts in order to address
the problem of optimizing coalition formation for a stable community.
• To reduce the complexity of computing the solution concepts of the cooperative
model tailored to the problem of communities of agent-based web services in order
to make these solutions applicable in real world scenarios.
• To analyze the effect of different membership and taxation models that the master
can apply to the members on the stability of the community.
• To investigate the impact of learning on individual and group decision making within
the cooperative model of the community.
4Requests and tasks are used in this thesis interchangeably.
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Figure 1.1: The Proposed Framework.
• To design the community decision making process in a distributed manner and train
agents so they can operate efficiently when information is incomplete.
• To validate the proposed methods by extensive simulations and comparison with other
similar proposals.
Figure 1.1 highlights our contributions and proposed model for communities of web
services formation and management.
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the proposal is organized as follows: We present in Chapter 2 the background
needed for our research along with relevant related work. We introduce the web services and
the concept of communities of web services and the theoretical background used throughout
the these. Chapter 3 provides an efficient method of coalition formation for web services.
In this chapter we have addressed [R1], [R2], [R3] research questions on efficient ways
12
of community formation. Chapter 4 presents a distributed method of formation of web
services communities. In this chapter we address [R4], [R5] research questions by proposing
DDM, a distributed decision making mechanism for our web services which can perform in
distributed manner and when information is incomplete. In Chapter 5 we delve into internal
management of communities of web services and we address the [R6] research question by
analyzing the cooperative behavior within the communities of web services. Finally in




In this chapter, we briefly review web services, then we introduce the concept of com-
munities of web services, their architecture and applications and the benefits of forming
communities. Thereafter, we discuss the cooperative game theory concepts used through-
out the thesis. Finally, we discuss relevant related work on web service communities and
games in the literature of service oriented computing.
2.1 Community of Web Services
In this section, we present web services and discuss the concept of their communities from
architectural and operations perspectives.
2.1.1 Web Services
Over the past years, online services have become part of standard daily life of people around
the globe. Many modern applications rely on web services from different providers. For
instance, many mobile and tablet applications which have limited storage and processing
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power are merely interfaces aggregating different information from online services. Ex-
amples are vast, weather forecasting, ticket selling, shopping apps, local maps and places
searching are some of them.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) defines web services as follows: “soft-
ware system designed to support interpretable machine-to-machine interaction over a net-
work. It has an interface described in a machine-processable format (specifically WSDL).
Other systems interact with the web service in a manner prescribed by its description using
SOAP messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with XML serialization in conjunction
with other Web-related standards”. When developers declare a new web service, it will be
discovered based on its description that fully discloses its functionalities. Developers also
have to declare a public interface and a readable documentation to help other developers
when integrating different services [22]. Nowadays, web API standards which do not re-
quire XML-based web service protocols like SOAP and WSDL are also emerging. They
are also called REST (representational state transfer) services which are moving towards
simpler communication protocols.
We are not going to delve into engineering details of online web service implemen-
tation and its protocols in this thesis. We are interested in web services from their business
model perspective. Service providers usually charge end users for services they provide.
For example, Google has listed their pricing and plans for wide range of services they pro-
vide on their web service console page1.
In our research work, we abstract web services as rational agents2 providing services
to end users. They aim to maximize their individual income by receiving enough requests
from end users. In order to increase their revenue, web services seek for more tasks if they
have the capacity and throughput to do so. Web services can join communities to have
1https://code.google.com/apis/console
2The term rational is used here in the sense that web services are utility maximizers
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better efficiency by collaborating with others, to have access to broad market share, and
to have opportunity of receiving a bigger task pool from end users. Furthermore, the high
reliance on web services has increased quality expectations from end users. Communities
of web services can provide higher availability, performance, reliability, and recovery for
end users.
2.1.2 Web Services Communities
Community refers to “the condition of sharing or having certain attitudes and interests in
common” or “a group of people living in the same place or having a particular characteristic
in common”3. In [14, 89], the authors introduce community of web services as collection of
cooperative web services with common functionalitiers but different QoS metrics. There-
fore communities are differentiated from composition types of web service cooperation in
which web services with different functionalities work together to generate a new service
with composite functionality.
Maamar et al. initially in [51] and then comprehensively in [53] proposed an architec-
ture utilizing Contract-Net protocol for engineering task distribution within communities.
This architecture has been further developed in [15, 43, 45, 54]. Two types of roles have
been distinguished for community members: masters and slaves. Master web services lead
communities and are responsible for membership management. They can invite and con-
vince slave web services to join the community, and attract new slave web services to their
communities by awarding them better payoff. Moreover, they can eject some slave members
from the community to improve its overall reputation if these members are misbehaving or
cannot provide the promised QoS [53].
Figure 1 depicts the basic architecture of communities of web services. The main
3Oxford Dictionaries
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Figure 2.1: Communities of Web Services Architecture as Proposed in [53].
components of the architecture are: 1) the providers of web services; 2) UDDI registries;
and 3) communities platform. Communities abstract the same model of defining, announc-
ing and invoking web services. They also adopt the same protocols that standard web
services use with UDDI registries. UDDI is a platform-independent XML based registry
list which facilitates worldwide web service discovery.
2.2 Cooperative Game Theory and Multi-Agent Systems
The theory of cooperative games is a branch of game theory that is a branch of game theory
that studies strategies of self-interested entities or agents in a setting where those agents can
increase their payoff by binding agreements and cooperating in groups. We let N be a set of
players which can form a group called a coalition. A coalitional game is a pair G= (N,v),
where v is called a characteristic function v : 2N → R, mapping the set of players of the
coalition to a real number v(N), the worth of N. This number usually represents the output
or payoff or again the performance of these players working together as coalition. If a
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coalition S is formed, then it can divide its worth, v(N) in any possible way among its
members. The payoff vector x ∈ RN is the amount of payoff being distributed among the
members of the coalition N. The payoff vector satisfies two conditions:
• xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N, and
• ∑i∈N xi ≤ v(N)
The second criterion is called the feasibility condition, according to which, the pay-
off for each agent cannot be more than the coalition total gain. A payoff vector is also
efficient if the payoff obtained by a coalition is distributed amongst the coalition members:
∑i∈N xi = v(N). This definition of the characteristic function works in transferable utility
(TU) settings, where utility (i.e., payoff) is transferable from one player to another, or in
other words, players have common currency and a unit of income that is worth the same for
all players [62].
When dealing with cooperative games, two issues need to be addressed:
1. Which coalitions among all possible coalitions to form?
2. How to reward each member when a task is completed?
The following sections help address these two issues.
2.2.1 Cooperative Game Concepts
Definition 1 (Shapley value) Given a cooperative game (N,v), the Shapley value of player







Shapley value is a unique and fair solution concept for payoff distribution among
the members of the coalition. It basically rewards members with the amount of marginal
contribution they have to the coalition. It checks the contribution of member i by adding
the agent, to all possible subsets of coalitions S, where S ⊆ N\{i}. If he is added to the
set S, his contribution to the coalition is v(S∪{i})− v(S). Average marginal contribution
of agent i’s is calculated by averaging this value over all possible subsets of N, in Shapley
value equation (2.1).




xi ≥ v(S) (2.2)
The core is basically a set of payoff vectors where no subset of players S′ could gain
more than their current payoff by deviating and making their own coalition ∑i∈S′ xi ≥ v(S
′).
The sum of payoffs of the players in any sub-coalition S is at least as large as the amount
that these players could earn by forming a coalition by their own. In a sense, it is analogue
to Nash equilibrium, except that core is about deviations from groups of entities. The core
is the strongest and most popular solution concept in cooperative game theory. However, its
computation is a combinatorial problem and becomes intractable as the number of players
increases. The core of some real-world problem games may be empty, which means having
the characteristic function of the game (N,v), there might be no possible distribution of
payoff assuring stability of subgroups.
Definition 3 (Convex cooperative games)A game (N,v)with characteristic function
v(S) is convex if:
v(S)+ v(T )≤ v(S∪T )+ v(S∩T ),∀S,T ⊆ N. (2.3)
According to a classic result by Shapley [77], convex games always have a non-empty




When the core set of a game is empty, it means no coalition of players can gain anything by
deviating. An outcome would be unstable if a coalition can benefit even by a small amount
from deviating, which is a strong requirement. In fact, in some situations, deviations can
be costly, or players may have loyalty to their coalitions, or even it can be computationally
intractable to find those small benefits. It would only make sense for a coalition to deviate if
the gain from a deviation exceeds the cost of performing the deviation. ε-core[79] relaxes
the notion of the core, and only requires that no coalition would benefit significantly, or
within a constant amount(ε) by deviating (see Equation 2.4).
∀S⊆ N, ∑
xi∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− ε (2.4)
Coalition Structure Formation
Coalition structure formation is the problem of finding the best partition of web services
into teams. In these settings, the performance of an individual service is less important
than the social welfare of the whole system, which is the sum of the values of all teams.
Having the game (N,v), a coalition structure (CS) is socially optimal if CS belongs to set
argmaxCS v(CS) where v(CS) is the sum of the values of all coalitions inside CS. v(CS) =
∑C∈CS v(C).
Example 1. Consider a game G = (N,v), with two players where N = 1,2. Each of these
players can produce 5 units of output working alone and by collaborating they can produce
20 units worth of output. Therefore we have: v(1) = 5,v(2) = 5,v(1,2) = 20. The core of
the game, which is the set of all possible distribution of gain among players guaranteeing
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Figure 2.2: Core of the 2-player game of example 1.
stability is: core(N,v) = {(x1,x2) ∈ R
2|x1 >= 5,x2 >= 5,x1+ x2 = 20}, as illustrated in
Figure 2. Distributing the 20 units of income, among these two players, for all the points
in the line will make outcome stable, since none of these players can gain more than 5 by
working alone. However although they have same qualities, the core can suggest a stable
outcome where one agent can earn three times more than the other agent: {5,15}. As
mentioned in previous section, core result may not be fair, the core only considers stability.
However, Shapley value considers fairness. According to Equation 2.1, the two workers
should each share 10 units of income, since they have the same marginal contribution to all
subsets of the coalition. As you can see the distribution vector of {10,10} is also a member
in core set. Later we are going to show if core of a coalition game is not empty, and game
is convex, the shapley value lies within core set.
Example 2. In this example, we want to analyse games under conditions which core can be
empty. Consider a gameG= (N,v), where N = 1,2,3 and v({i}) = 0, v({Ci}) =α f or|C|=
2 and v({N}) = 1. The (x1,x2,x3) distribution vector according to Equation 2.2, is in core
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if xi ≥ 0 which implies each player will get more than 0 which they would when working
alone and ∀i,∀ j,xi+ x j ≥ α which implied any pair of players will get more than α which
they would earn if they worked in pair without the third player and finally ∑i∈N xi = 1 which
implied all the gain is distributed among the three players. Based on these three equations
we have, ∀i ∈ N06 1−α and ∑i∈N xi = 1. By summing first equation for all three platers,
we concludeCore(N,v) is nonempty iff α 6 2
3
. When alpha is more than 2
3
, the contribution
of third player is not good enough to justify the group of three players working together.
The third player will increase the revenue with less then 1
3
, and the other two players, both
can get better share of revenue if they work together. This is why the group of three players
working together when α > 2
3
is not stable.
2.2.2 Stability of Coalitions
Core stability is a highly desirable property. However, in many problems this property is
not achievable. It would be more ideal to maintain a set of quasi-stable payoffs when the
core is empty. There are several approaches to achieve this goal. One may drop the stability
requirement and focus on other types of solutions for which a payoff division is guaranteed
to exist. Two well known solution concepts in this category are nucleolus [76] and the
bargaining set [25]. They try to minimize some measure of unhappiness in the game for
the agents.
Another approach to stabilize the game can be achieved via external subsidies. When
Core is empty it means the game is not stable since the coalition is unable to generate
enough revenue to satisfy the demands of each subset of agents. An external party that is
interested in stabilizing the game provides a subsidy to the agents if they form the grand
coalition, and thus a value of λv(C) is divided among them, where λ ≥ 1. Clearly any game
can be stabilized using a large enough λ , however the external party would be interested in
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the minimal subsidy required in order to stabilize the game.
A community can also be stabilized by relaxing the core constraints. According to
Core, an outcome is unstable if a coalition can benefit even by a small amount from deviat-
ing, which is a strong requirement. In fact, in some situations, deviations can be costly, or
players may have loyalty to their coalitions, or even it can be computationally intractable
to find those small benefits. It would only make sense for a coalition to deviate if the gain
from a deviation exceeds the cost of performing the deviation. ε-core relaxes the notion of
the core, and only requires that no coalition would benefit significantly, or within a constant
amount (ε) by deviating (see Equation 2.5).
∀S⊆ N, ∑
xi∈S
xi ≥ v(S)− ε (2.5)
Alternatively, ε can be thought of as a tax imposed on a coalition should it choose
to deviate. This can again be seen as an external party, trying to stabilize the coalition
by imposing some tax on deviation. Taxation and subsidizing as methods of stabilizing
cooperative games have been studied in [13, 11, 60].
2.2.3 Representation and Complexity Issues
Shapley value is the unique “fair” way to distribute the total surplus generated by the coali-
tion, among all the players. The nature of the Shapley value is combinatorial, as all possible
orderings to form a coalition needs to be considered. This computational complexity can
sometimes be an advantage as agents cannot benefit from manipulation. For example, it
is NP-complete to determine whether for a bunch of agents to collude and make their own
coalition and guarantee an increase in payoff of all participants [88]. There are some repre-
sentations that allow us to compute the Shapley value efficiently by reducing the input size
of the problem. One example is Induced subgraph games which was introduced by Deng
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and Papadimitriou [28]. In this representation, players are represented by graph nodes, and
their valuation function should be the sum of weights of all edges between the node and all
its neighbors. It is a succinct representation, using an adjacency matrix, which needs only
O(n2) space to store all the input, which is a major improvement from O(2n) because if
weights of all the edges in graph are all positive, the Shapley value can be computed in time
O(n2). However, this representation is not complete, some games cannot be represented by
a induced subgraph game [88].
Ketchpel introduces the Bilateral Shapley Value (BSV) [39] for coalition games with
general valaution functions. It reduces the combinatorial complexity of the computation
of the Shapley value, breaking the community to multiple disjoint set. With backtracking
and dynamic programming like methods, they merge and store the marginal contribution of
disjoint coalitions, reducing the overall complexity of the algorithm. However, the solution
is still NP-Complete and BSV time and space complexity grows exponentially.
In order to make cooperative game concepts practical in real world application, we
have proposed an approximation multi-layer algorithm useful for service orinted comput-
ing settings. Our excrements illustrate, these algorithms can provide applicable and near
optimal solutions for real world applications.
2.3 Related Work
2.3.1 Communities of Web Services
Here we introduce the related research work regarding the engineering and formation of
communities of web services. In [14], Benatallah et al. defined communities as Service
Containers that aggregate substitutable web services providing a common functionality
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(same set of operations). They abstracted Service Containers as web services that are cre-
ated, advertised, discovered and invoked just as elementary web services. The Container
is considered as a manager that is responsible for web service selection upon receiving a
request on run-time. The authors have proposed a scoring service based on non-functional
requirements of the request and web service capabilities to dynamically chose the web ser-
vice to perform the requested task. A similar concept was proposed by Maamar et al. in
[53]. The authors introduced web services communities as a collection of web services with
a common functionality but different QoS properties. A community manager, upon receiv-
ing a request, delegates the request to one of its current members. The choice is based on the
performance history and quality metrics of each web service. The authors have proposed an
efficient global web service selection algorithm in order to approach quality constraints and
preferences for composite services which require aggregation of different types of services
to satisfy the user.
Benslimane et al. [17] have proposed a multi-layer approach grouping similar Web
services into communities and having an interface implemented as an abstract web service
for accessing the community on top of the community layer. The interactions between
composite, management and community layers and the bindings are performed by a generic
driver called Open Software Connectivity (OSC).
In [47], Limam and Akaichi have proposed web service communities with centralized
access across distributed web services. They have proposed a framework for web service
management, query resolution among communities and a query caching mechanism exe-
cuted by the manager to improve the performance of query resolution process among many
distributed communities. The key idea is to cache previous computed results for answering
future queries.
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Maamar et al. initially in [51] and then comprehensively in [53] proposed an archi-
tecture utilizingContract-Net protocol for engineering task distribution within communities
of web services. The protocol is centrally executed by the community manager. This ar-
chitecture has been further developed in [54, 15, 43, 45]. Two types of roles have been
distinguished for community members: masters and slaves. Master web services and com-
munity managers that lead communities and are responsible for membership management.
They can invite and convince slave web services to join the community, and attract new
slave web services to their communities by awarding them better payoff. Moreover, they
can eject some slave members from the community to improve its overall reputation if these
members are misbehaving or cannot provide the promised QoS.
In [59], Medjahed and Bouguettaya have developed a community as a “cluster” that
groupsWeb services based on a specific area of interest. All web services in a given commu-
nity share the same functionality. These communities are created by third party community
providers which use the community ontology as a template and define a set of operations
that all web services within a community should provide. Using semantic analysis on web
service operations, web services either find and join a community with similar functionality
or create a new operation description for a new community. The authors have described the
concept of community agents associated to community providers. A community agent is
responsible, among other things, of the registration of services with the community. An
example of a community that provides health care services to senior citizens has been used.
In this example, a governmental entity is needed to check the health care standards used by
the members before authorizing them to be part of the community. Such a central entity
is represented by the community agent. Thus, community agents are playing the role of
community managers. In a close work [89], Zeng et al. have described a global planning
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selection algorithm and a delegation algorithm to be run when a request to execute an op-
eration is received by the community. This needs a central entity to run those algorithms.
Such entity plays the same role as the community coordinator or manager.
2.3.2 Web Services Community Formation
Most of the recent work on communities of services are either user-centric and focus on user
satisfaction [23] or system-centric and focus on the whole system throughput, performance
and utilization. There are many contributions in distributed, grid, cluster and cloud services
which are system-centric. However, in real world environments and applications, both
users and service providers are self-interested agents, aiming to maximize their own profit.
In those environments, both parties (users and services) will collaborate as long as they are
getting more benefits and payoff.
In this direction, recently [46, 41, 48] proposed mechanisms to help users and ser-
vices maximize their gain. A two-player non-cooperative game between web services and
community master was introduced in [41]. In this game-theoretic model, the strategies
available to a web service when facing a new community are requesting to join the commu-
nity, accepting the master’s invitation to join the community, or refusing the invitation to
join. The set of strategies for communities are inviting the web service or refusing the web
service’s join request. Based on their capacity, market share and reputation, the two players
have different sets of utilities over the strategy profiles of the game. The main limits of
this game model are: 1) its consideration of only three quality parameters, while the other
factors are simply ignored; and 2) the non-consideration of the web services already resid-
ing within the community. The game is only between the community master and the new
web service, and the inputs from all the other members and their influence on the master’s
decision are simply ignored. The consideration of those inputs and this influence factor
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is a significant issue as existing web services can lose utility or payoff because of the new
member, which can result in an unhealthy and unstable group. The problem comes from the
fact that the existing members should collaborate with the new web services, so probably
their performance as a group can suffer. Existing members may even deviate and try to
join other communities if they are unsatisfied. Those considerations of forming stable and
efficient coalitions are the main contributions of our research work.
In [46], a 3-way satisfaction approach for selecting web services has been proposed.
In this approach, the authors proposed a web service selection process that the community
masters can use. The approach considers the efficiency of all the three involved parties,
namely users, web services and communities. In this work, it is shown how the gains of
these parties are coupled together using a linear optimization process. However, the opti-
mization problem in this solution tends to optimize some parameters considering all web
services regardless of their efficiency and contribution to the community’s welfare. More-
over, there are no clear thresholds for accepting or rejecting new web services. The solu-
tion of the optimization problem could, for instance, suggest web services already residing
within the community to increase or decrease their capacity to cover up the weakness of
other parties in the system. However, a high performing web service could deviate anytime
it finds itself unsatisfied within the community instead of adjusting its service parameters.
In [48], a cooperative scheme among autonomous web services based on coalitional
game theory has been introduced. The authors have proposed an interesting algorithm to
reach individually stable coalition partition for web services in order to maximize their ef-
ficiency. The communities choose new web services on the promise that it would benefit
the community without decreasing any other web service’s income. In the proposed model,
the worth of community is evaluated with high emphasis on the availability metric and con-
sidering price and cost values only. The community structure is based on a coordination
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chain, where a web service is considered as a primary web service and the community task-
distribution method initially invokes the primary web service and only if the primary web
service is unavailable, the method invokes the next backup web services as they are ordered
in the coordination chain. We believe that this coordination chain limits the cooperation
power as it introduces a sort of hierarchy. However, in pure and open cooperative models,
such as the one we propose in this thesis, active cooperation activities engaging simulta-
neously many agents so that they can perform the tasks more efficiently are being used.
Moreover, if the availability is high, which is the case nowadays with the recent advance-
ments in cloud and hardware infrastructures, the backup web services will end-up having a
very low chance of getting jobs, especially the ones further in the chain. This will results in
a considerable waste of web services capabilities.
2.3.3 Coopetitive Behavior Within Communities of Web Services
At the best of our knowledge, there is no work in the literature of service and agent com-
puting addressing the issue of coopetition strategies and when to cooperate or to compete.
However, some relevant proposals to our proposed model are the ones that address service
selection and task allocation mechanisms. In many frameworks proposed in the litera-
ture, service selection and task allocation are regulated based on the reputation parameter
[18, 72, 74, 85]. In [35], the authors propose a framework to match potential benefits of
services while cooperating with one another. The interesting idea is to consider the benefits
under four categories: innovation and learning, internal business process, customer, and fi-
nancial benefits. Innovation and learning perspective focuses on the knowledge, skills, and
systems needed to improve the business continually. Necessary factors to build strategic
capabilities and efficiency in addressed in internal business process. Values that customers
seek are considered in customer perspective and financial performance to maximize the
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shareholder value are analyzed in financial perspective. Their goal is to design the frame-
work for cooperating web services, inline with business strategy of firms in IT industry. In
[3], the authors present a dependable framework for cooperative service agents that is based
on the tuple space coordination model. The intrusion-tolerant perspective is emphasized in
the paper where several security mechanisms are developed to enable a reliable coordina-
tion system. The proposed frameworks mostly aim to facilitate the coordination mechanism
between services. However, the opposite strategy of competing is not analyzed where ser-
vices might be more successful when competing within the same group. In fact, services
are not always willing to cooperate even if they have some common goals, particularly
when they operate within groups such as communities. In such a context, service agents
can follow different interacting strategies and have to decide when to compete and when
to cooperate so that their ultimate goal, maximizing their incomes, can be better achieved.
In our framework, we analyze those different strategies to help services in their decision
making process when these agents function within communities. We enable service agents
to reasonably evaluate and decide over their coopetition strategies, which means deciding
when to compete and when to cooperate.
Furthermore, there are a number of related proposals that take into account the corre-
lation between (web) services and the ways these services coordinate their actions to accom-
plish the required tasks. In [38, 37, 56, 58, 85], the authors propose to rank services based
on their reputation in the system and to use this ranking as a means to facilitate cooperation
of services. In those models, services rely on one another on the basis of the reputation
ranking system, using, among other parameters, the QoS [81]. There are other models that
facilitate cooperation mechanisms among services using various techniques. Examples of
those techniques include 1) coordination between two types of behaviors associated with
component services: operational and control behaviors [86]; 2) Services-based workflows
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[83]; 3) transaction-based approaches [32, 70]; 4) agent coordination mechanisms [21, 34];
5) logical techniques [63, 80]; and 6) community models, which are virtual structures that
aim at increasing the visibility of services and facilitating their discovery and composi-
tion by hosting and gathering services having similar or complementary functionalities but
different QoS parameters [44]. However, deciding about which strategy to choose when
services are competing but still need to cooperate to accomplish complex tasks has not
been addressed and kept as open issue in all these proposals as faithfully argued in [55, 40].
2.4 Conclusive Remarks
In this thesis, as the first contribution, we will tackle the issue of community formation in an
efficient way for all the web services and communities involved. We will use game theory
to propose a cooperative game model for the aggregation of web services within communi-
ties. The solution concepts of our cooperative game seeks to find efficient ways of forming
coalitions (teams) of web services so that they can maximize their gain and payoff, and
distribute the gain in a fair way among all the web services. Achieving fairness when the
gain is distributed among the community members is the main factor to keep the coalition
stable as no web service will expect to gain better by deviating from the community. In
other words, the coalition is made efficient if all the members are satisfied. We first propose
a representation function for communities of web services based on their QoS attributes.
By using this function, we can evaluate the worth of each community of web services.
When facing new membership requests, a typical community master checks whether the
new coalition having the old and new set of web services will keep the community stable or
not. The community master will reject the membership requests if it finds out that the new
coalition would be unstable, preventing any subset of web services from gaining signifi-
cantly more by deviating from the community and joining other communities or forming
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new ones. The computation of solutions for cooperative game theory problems is combina-
torial in nature and proven to be NP-complete [27], making this computation impractical in
real world applications. However, using the concepts of coalition stability, we proposed ap-
proximation algorithms running in polynomial time providing web services and community
masters with applicable and near-optimal decision making mechanisms.
Next, we will tackle the issue of distributed model of web services and propose a
decision model for scenarios where information is incomplete. We will propose a train-
ing model for the problem of membership management of communities of web services.
Using the traning model we aim to create a decision making profile for each community
and web service involved which provides them with a set of feasible and utility increasing
moves. This will equip our web services with efficient methods of foreseeing how their
choices of actions would impact their long-term and short-term goals, therefore they opted
for best decision available. The ultimate goal is to choose the best decision when it comes
to communities formation, among many possible short-term rational and utility increasing
choices.
In our last contribution, the focus is on internal community management. We will
introduce a game-theoretic based model to analyze the efficiency characteristics for the ac-
tive services in open networks. The proposed framework will consider the chances of web
services in joining a community in different cases with truthful and lying information ser-
vice agents. The proposed game will analyze the existing Nash equilibrium and situations
where the maximum payoff is obtained.
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Chapter 3
Coalition Formation for Autonomous
Web Services
In this chapter, we present our coalition model of agent-based web services within com-
munities [9]. We start by describing the general architecture and considered parameters for
web services. Thereafter, problem modeling and formulation will be introduced in terms
of task distribution and community revenue. Web service cooperative games in different
settings will follow along with simulation results.
3.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we discuss the parameters and preliminary concepts that we use in the rest
of the chapter.
3.1.1 Architecture
Our system consists of three main types of entities working together:
1) Web services are rational entities that aim to maximize their utilities by providing
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high quality services to end users. They aim to maximize their individual income by re-
ceiving enough requests from end users. In order to increase their revenue, web services
seek for more tasks if they have the capacity and throughput to do so. Web services can
join communities to have better efficiency by collaborating with others, to have access to
higher market share, and to have opportunity of receiving a bigger task pool from end users.
Throughout this thesis, in our equations, we refer to web services as ws and to the set of
web services hosted by a given community as C. To simplify the notation, sometimes we
simply write ws instead of ws ∈C to go through the elements ws of the setC.
2) Master Web Services or the community coordinators, are representatives of the
communities of web services and responsible for their management. Communities receive
requests from users and aim to host a healthy set of web services to perform the required
tasks. They seek to maximize user satisfaction by having tasks accomplished according to
the desired QoS. In fact, higher user satisfaction will bring more user requests and increase
the market share and revenue of the community.
3) Users generate requests and try to find the best available services. User satisfaction
is abstracted as function of quantity and quality of tasks accomplished by a given service.
Higher user satisfaction leads to higher trust of the community by users hence directing
more requests towards that service provider.
3.1.2 Web Service Parameters
Web services come with different quality of service parameters. These parameters with a
short description are listed in Table 3.1.
We adopted a real world dataset [2] which has aggregated and normalized each of
these parameters to a real value between 0 and 1. Since requests are not shared among web
services and are distributed among all of them inside a community, each one of them comes
34
Table 3.1: List of web service QoS parameters.
Parameter Definition
Availability Probability of being available during
a time frame
Reliability Probability of successfully handling
requests during a timeframe
Successability Rate of successfully handled requests
Throughput Average rate of handling requests
Latency The average latency of services
Capacity Amount of resources available
Cost Mean service fee
Regulatory Compliance with standards, law and rules
Security Quality of confidentiality
and non-repudiation
with a given QoS denoted by (QoSws). We assume that (QoSws) is obtained by a certain
aggregation function of the parameters considered in Table 3.1. We use this quality output
later in evaluating the community worth or payoff function.
3.1.3 Web Services Communities
Figure 3.1 represents our revised architecture of web service communities where tasks are
to be distributed among the members that are interested in forming stable coalitions. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, communities are essentially virtual platforms aggregating web services
having similar and complementary functionalities and communicate with other entities such
as UDDI registries and users using particular protocols. Web services join communities to
increase their utility by having larger market share and task pool. Community coordinators
or master web services are responsible for community development, managing member-
ship requests from web services and distributing user tasks among the community mem-
bers. Community coordinators try to attract quality web services and keep the community
as stable and productive as possible to gain better reputation and user satisfaction, which


















Figure 3.1: Architecture of Web Services communities.
3.2 Problem Formulation and Modeling
In this section, we present web services and community coordinator’s interactions, the task
distribution process and revenue models in web services communities.
3.2.1 Task Distribution
As mentioned in Section 3.1, communities are robust service providers with well estab-
lished market share and reputation. By maintaining their reputation and performance, they
attract end users which choose them as service providers to perform their tasks. The com-
munity master is characterized by a request rate (RC) from users. Each web service comes
with a given QoS (QoSws) from which the throughput Thws is excluded. Throughput is the
average rate of tasks a web service can perform per time unit. Its exclusion from QoSws
allows us to build our analysis on the particular value of Thws. Thus, web services perform
tasks with an average output quality of QoSws and a throughput rate of Thws.
The community master uses a slightly modified weighted fair queuing method to
distribute tasks among its members. The goal is to allocate incoming tasks to web services
with a rate matching the throughput value of Thws. In weighted fair queuing method all the
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input flow is multiplexed along different paths, however in our case if the input rate (RC)
of the community is more than the summation of throughput values of the web services in
the community, some of the input tasks will be queued and served with delay. Thus, the
amount of tasks performed by community is ∑ws∈C (Thws) when ∑wsThws ≤ RC. However,
when the input rate (RC) of the community is less than the summation of throughput values
of the web services in the community, (RC) the weighted fair queuing algorithm assigns
a weighted task rate of RC×
Thws
∑wsThws
for each web service (ws) and the total rate of tasks
being performed is RC, the community’s receiving request rate.
While distributing tasks, the community master can verify the performance, through-
put and quality of service of tasks being performed by web services. It can recognize if
web services are capable of doing the amount of tasks they advertised. If for any reason
there is a decline in quality metrics or throughput, the community master will announce the
new parameters and community masters and members can consider those values as bench-
mark for future performance calculations. Web services that got their quality declined are
penalized, and in this way, players have incentive to reveal their real capabilities to profit
best from the community and to avoid being penalized. In addition, the system should be
dynamic enough to detect and react to web services quality metrics variation as over time
web service metrics may degrade or improve, a change that the community should adjust
to.
3.2.2 Community Revenue
The communities and web services earn revenue by performing tasks. The total gain is func-
tion of quality (QoSws) and throughput (Thws) of tasks being performed. We have adopted
a linear equal weight average over the QoS parameters excluding the Throughput andCost
parameters. A community has the option to weigh specific QoS parameters depending on
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Table 3.2: Case Study: Example 1
WS QoSws Thws Thws×QoSws
1 0.8 4 3.2
2 0.8 5 4.0
3 0.8 3 2.4
the expectations of their clients.
The maximum potential output of a community (PO(C)) is an aggregation of number




If the summation of throughput values (Thws) of community members exceeds the
input task rate of the community (RC) the community cannot perform at its maximum po-
tential. It denotes the case when the community has more web services than it needs to





PO(C) if ∑wsThws ≤ RC
PO(C)× RC
∑wsThws
if ∑wsThws > RC
(3.2)
The revenue function of the web services community is a linear function of Out(C)
with a positive constant multiplier.
3.2.3 Case Study
In this section, we analyze three numerical examples and discuss the motivation of web
services and community interactions and the strategies they can adopt and the revenue they
can earn adopting these different strategies.
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Community Worth Community Worth
{1} 3.2 {1,2} 7.2
{2} 4.0 {1,3} 5.6
{3} 2.4 {2,3} 6.4
{1,2,3} 8.0
Community RC: 10
Table 3.3: Case Study: Example 2
WS QoSws Thws Thws×QoSws
1 0.8 5 4.0
2 0.7 6 4.2
3 0.7 4 2.8
In the first example, we present the case of a community with RC = 10, and three
web services, each having different QoSws and Thws values as listed in Table 3.2. The
worth of a community is calculated based on Out(C) Equation (3.2) which is the amount
of output being generated by the community. The first table lists the web services with
their aggregated QoSws parameters, their task input rate while working alone, and also their
throughput value Thws. The second table shows all the possible communities and their
respective worth. The obtained values suggest that communities having more web services
have better gain and output. However each community needs to distribute the gain between
web services. Sometimes it is impossible to share the gain between all web services in a way
that no subset of them would individually gain more if they form their own group. In this
example, the value community of ws1 and ws2 is 7.2, With ws3 joining the community the
worth increases to 8.0. However there is no way to distribute the value among web services
to have ws1 and ws2 earning 7.2, and ws3 earning at least 2.4, the gain they could earn
before joining the community. This fact makes the group unstable. In the second example,
shown in Table 3.3, we even have situations where a web service (ws3) joining a community
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Community Worth Community Worth
{1} 4.0 {1,2} 7.4
{2} 4.2 {1,3} 6.8
{3} 2.8 {2,3} 7.0
{1,2,3} 7.3
Community RC: 10
Table 3.4: Case Study: Example 3
WS QoSws Thws Input Task Rate
1 0.8 10 5
2 0.8 20 5
3 0.8 30 5
({ws1,ws2}) decreases the value of community. The reason is, the community is already
full and all tasks are almost being distributed and new community with bad quality can
degrade the average quality of tasks being done by the community. In both examples, the
request of joining of web service ws3 should be rejected by the community.
In Example 3, we consider the case of having different communities with different
market share, RC values. Web services also have a small share of market independently,
providing them with a small task pull. In these kind of scenarios, the solution considers
individual maximization of payoff and also the total worth of all communities which rep-
resents the social welfare. In this example the most efficient partition of web services is
earned by having two coalitions of {Cmaster1 ,ws2} and {Cmaster2 ,ws1,ws3}, which yields a
total value of 32+16= 48. In these types of scenarios, the goal is to reach stability, adopt-
ing a distributed approach where all players have the power of choice on the decision of
whether or not they join a coalition. The communities usually start the game having some
established members, encountering new web services, the communities may exchange web
services and new web services would join them having at least one player gaining utility,
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Community Worth Community Worth
{Cms1} 0 {Cms2} 0
{Cms1 ,ws1} 8 {Cms2 ,ws1} 8
{Cms1 ,ws2} 16 {Cms2 ,ws2} 16
{Cms1 ,ws3} 16 {Cms2 ,ws3} 24
{Cms1 ,ws1,ws2} 16 {Cms2 ,ws1,ws2} 24
{Cms1 ,ws1,ws3} 16 {Cms2 ,ws1,ws3} 32
{Cms1 ,ws2,ws3} 16 {Cms2 ,ws2,ws3} 32
{Cms1 ,ws1,ws2,ws3} 16 {Cms2 ,ws1,ws2,ws3} 32
{Cms1 ,Cms2 , ...} 0 {ws1} 6.8
{ws2} 4.2 {ws3} 6.8
Community RC1: 20
Community RC2: 40
without hurting any other participant. In this example if we initially having two coalitions
of {Cmaster1 ,ws2} and {Cmaster2 ,ws1} and a ws3 as new web service, ws3 joining Cmaster1
would hurt at least itself or ws2, however ws3 joining Cmaster2 would not hurt any partici-
pants and ws3 would earn more within the community and the community will have enough
web services performing the incoming tasks from users.
The first two examples illustrate the fact that a community cannot simply increase
its revenue by adding more web services. The web services and even community owners
are autonomous agents and would deviate and be displeased about the community if new
members cause a drop in their profit. The job of the community master is to attract as many
quality web services it can and keep them satisfied; hence the group stability is guaranteed.
The third example highlights another type of problem we would like to address, which
is how to form best possible groups of communities, and allocate web services among
communities in a way which would maximize payoff for of our agents and members already
residing in the communities. In next section, we provide collaborative game theory based
algorithms for our autonomous agents, to tackle these problems and find applicable and
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efficient strategies for communities and web services to maximize their profit.
3.3 Web Service Cooperative Games
In this section, we present different web services community models and focus on the prob-
lem of how both web services and community masters as rational entities would adopt
strategies to maximize their payoff.
3.3.1 Web Services and One Community
In this scenario, we assume the existence of a typical community managed by its master,
and web services need to join it to be able to get requests from the master. The community
master is characterized by a requests rate (RC) from users. Each web service comes with
a given QoS (QoSws). The worth of a community v(C) is set to Out(C) based on Equation
3.2.
As mentioned in previous section, the worth and output of a community is a function
of the throughput and provided QoS of its web service members. If the throughput rate is
more than the master’s input request rate, it means the web services inside the community
are capable of serving more requests than the demand. Considering this factor, the valu-
ation function is designed to balance the output performance so that it matches the exact
throughput rate and QoS the web service can provide within the particular community.
In this first scenario, we only consider one grand coalition and analyze the system
from the point of view of one single master web service and a collection of web services.
The master web service decides which members can join the community and distributes the
requests and income among its community members (see Figure 3.2).
The membership decision is made based on throughput and QoS of the considered
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‘Figure 3.2: Web Services and A Grand Community.
web service. The goal is to have quality web services in the community so it stays stable and
no other web services would have incentives to deviate and leave the coalitionC. Therefore,
a basic method would be to check the core of the coalition C considering all the current
community members (all web services already residing within the community) and the new
web service. This algorithm uses the Shapley value distribution method as described in
Equation 2.1 to distribute the gain of v(C) among all the members and then checks if the
Shapley value payoff vector for this community having the characteristic function v(C) is
in the core. In the Shapley value payoff vector, the payoff for each web service wsi is
calculated based on its marginal contribution v(C∪ i)− v(C) over all the possible different
permutations in which the coalition can be formed, which makes the payoff distribution
fair. Because of going through all the possible permutations of subsets of N, the nature
of the Shapley value is combinatorial, which makes it impractical to use as the size of our
coalitions grows. However, it is proven that in convex games, the Shapley value lies in the
core [33, 62]. Thus, if the Core is non-empty, the payoff vector is a member of the Core.
The following proposition is important to make our algorithm tractable.
Theorem 3.1. A game with a characteristic function v is convex if and only if for all S, T ,
and i where S⊆ T ⊆ N\{i} ,∀i ∈ N,
v(S∪{i})− v(S)≤ v(T ∪{i})− v(T ) (3.3)
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Proof. We first prove the “only if” direction:
1. “only if” direction:
Assume:
v(S∪{i})− v(S)≤ v(T ∪{i})− v(T )
→ v(S∪{i})+ v(T )≤ v(T ∪{i})+ v(S)
Considering S⊆ T :
T ∪{i}= (S∪{i})∪T
S= (S∪{i})∩T
By setting A= S∪{i} and B= T we have:
v(S∪{i})+ v(T )≤ v(T ∪{i})+ v(S)
→ v(S∪{i})+ v(T )≤
v((S∪{i})∪T )+ v((S∪{i})∩T )
→ v(A)+ v(B)≤ v(A∪B)+ v(A∩B)
Consequently, the game is convex.
2. “if” direction:
Assume the game is convex. Thus, for all A,B⊂ N, we have:
v(A)− v(A∩B)≤ v(A∪B)− v(B)
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By setting S∪{i}= A and T = B where S⊆ T :
v(S∪{i})− v((S∪{i})∩T )≤ v(T ∪ (S∪{i}))− v(T )
→ v(S∪{i})− v(S)≤ v(T ∪{i})− v(T )
Thus, in order to keep the characteristic function convex, new web services should
have more marginal contribution as the coalition size grows.
Our algorithm works as follows. Given an established community with a master and
some member web services, a web service would send a join request to join the community.
Ideally, the core or ε-core stability of the group having this new member should be ana-
lyzed. As the normal core membership algorithm is computationally intractable, we exploit
Proposition 3.1 and Equation 3.3 to check the convexity of our game having characteristic
function where the newmember is added. In the equation, letC be our community members
before having the new web service join the community. Let i be the new web service, and
then verify the equation for S, setting S= T/W1 whereW1 is the set of all possible subsets
of the set N having the size 1. We can relax the equation a bit by adding a constant ε to the
left side of the equation. We call this method Depth-1 Convex-Checker algorithm. If the
equation is satisfied for allW1, we let the new web service join our community, since the
web service will contribute positively enough to make our new community stable. Since
only subsets of size 1 are checked, the following Proposition holds.
Theorem 3.2. The run time complexity of Depth-1 Convex-Checker algorithm is O(n).
By this result, we obtain a significant reduction from O(2n), which is the complexity
of checking all possible subsets of N. In our second method, we use the same algorithm,
but this time we set W2 to be the set of all possible subsets of size two and one of the
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Figure 3.3: Web Services and Many Communities.
communityC. We call this method Depth-2 Convex-Checker and its run time complexity is
still linear:
Theorem 3.3. The run time complexity of Depth-2 Convex-Checker algorithm is O(n2).
It is possible to develop an algorithm that continues the verification of this condition
against subsets of size 3, 4, etc. until the algorithm gets interrupted.
3.3.2 Web Services and Many Communities
In this scenario, we consider multiple communities managed by multiple master web ser-
vices, each of which is providing independent request pools (see Figure 3.3). Identical to
the first scenario, master web services form coalitions with web services. We use coali-
tion structure formation methods to partition web services into non-empty disjoint coalition
structures. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the used algorithms in [75, 33, 67] try to solve
key fundamental problems of what coalitions to form, and how to divide the payoffs among
the collaborators.
In coalition-formation games, formation of the coalitions is the most important as-
pect. The solutions focus on maximizing the social welfare. For any coalition structure
pi , let vcs(pi) denote the total worth ∑C∈pi v(C), which represents the social welfare. The
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solution concepts in this area deal with finding the maximum value for the social welfare
over all the possible coalition structures pi . There are centralized algorithms for this end,
but these approaches are generally NP-complete. The reason is that the number of all pos-
sible partitions of the set N grows exponentially with the number of players in N, and the
centralized algorithms need to iterate through all these partitions. In our model, we propose
using a distributed algorithm where each community master and web service can be a de-
cision maker and decide for its own good. The aim is to find less complex and distributed
algorithms for forming web services coalitions [5, 29, 68]. The distributed merge-and-split
algorithm in [5] suits our application very well. It keeps splitting and merging coalitions to
partitions which are preferred by all the players inside those coalitions.
This merge-and-split algorithm is designed to be adaptable to different applications.
One major ingredient to use such an algorithm is a preference relation or well-defined orders
proper for comparing collections of different coalition partitions of the same set of players.
Having two partition sets of players, namely P = P1, ...,Pk and Q = Q1, ...Ql , one example
would be to use the social welfare comparison ∑
k
i=1 v(Pi) > ∑
l
j=1 v(Q j). For our scenario,
we use Pareto order comparison, which is an individual-value order appropriate for our
self-interest web services. In the Pareto order, an allocation or partition P is preferred over
another Q if at least one player improves its payoff in the new allocation and all the other
players still maintain their payoff (pi ≥ qi with at least one element pi > qi).
The valuation function v(C) for this scenario is the same as “Web Services and One
Community” scenario. However, in order to prevent master web services joining the same
community, we set v(C) = 0 when C has either none, or more than one master web service
as member.
In this scenario, as new web services are discovered and get ready to join communi-
ties, our algorithm keeps merging and splitting partitions based on the preference function.
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The decision to merge or split is based on the fact that all players must benefit. The new web
services will merge with communities if all the players are able to improve their individual
payoff, and some web services may split from old communities, if splitting does not de-
crease the payoff of any web service of the community. According to [4], this sequence of
merging and splitting will converge to a final partition, where web services cannot improve
their payoff. More details of this algorithm and analysis of generic solutions on coalition
formation games are described in [5].
3.3.3 Taxation, Subsidizing and Community Stability
We discussed core as one of the prominent solution concepts in cooperative games. Work-
ing together, completing tasks and generating revenue, agents need to distribute the gain in
a way no agents would gain more by forming their own group. However, in most cases,
the core of a game is empty, so we introduced the ε-core concept, where agents would only
earn a minimal amount of ε by deviating from the coalition. Stability is an attractive prop-
erty for communities. In addition, communities would benefit by having slightly more web
services than the exact number of web services needed to satisfy the task rate cap. This is
because there is always a possibility that the web services may leave the community or they
may under perform and degrade the quality values they were initially performing with.
The solution we propose for communities to ensure stability is applying a tax ε ,
which is an amount of cost for those web services that decide to change communities (let
us say fromC toC′), which would make deviation a costly act. However, this would require
all the community coordinators to agree on a same amount of taxation, being governed by
some external entities; otherwise, web services would join communities charging the lowest
amount of tax. Before deciding to change the community, each web service i has to be sure
that the gain gi(C→C
′) calculated in Equation 3.4 based on the Shapley values of i in the
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previous and new communities and the tax ε is positive, which means, what the web service





Another viable solution we introduce to our scenario is to stabilize the game using
external subsidies. The reason a game is not stable is that the community is not making
enough revenue to allocate enough gain to the players. A community coordinator can sub-
sidize its community with a constant coefficient value of λ . Obviously, with a big value
for λ , it is always possible to stabilize the community. However, this can be a costly act
for the community coordinators, so they are interested in the minimum subsidize value
of λ making the community stable. This can be achieved by solving the following linear
program:
min λ
s.t. λv(C)> v(C′) for allC′ ⊂C
Subsidizing or taxing in order to reduce the bargaining power of sub coalitions are
called taxation [92] methods. We evaluate the effectiveness of these two methods experi-
mentally through extensive implementations in the next section.
3.4 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we discuss the experiments we performed for our scenarios to validate the
applicability and performance of our proposed methods in realistic environments. An XML
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SOAP based messaging system was implemented. We created a pool of web services and
populated most of their QoS parameters from a real world web service dataset [2]1. To
test our methods, we formed around 10,000 random coalitions consisting of 3 to 160 web
services. In average, the communities were populated by 60 web services. We implemented
the scenarios using Java and executed the experiments on an Intel Xeon X3450 machine
with 6GBs of memory.
One of the key criteria reflecting the performance of web service coalitions is the user
satisfaction. User satisfaction can be measured in terms of quality and quantity of requests
(or tasks) successfully answered by the communities. We initiated the communities with
few web services, then let rejecting and accepting random web services go for a short
number of iterations. After that, we started the request distribution for the communities
and let them allocate requests among member web services. Thereafter, we measured the
average output performance of tasks in communities following different methods.
Figure 3.4 depicts the results of optimal ε-core, Depth-1 Convex-Checker, Depth-2
Convex-Checker, 3-Way Satisfaction [46], and 2 Player Non-Cooperative [41] methods in
one grand community with many web services scenario.
For the optimal core method we have used the well known ε-core method as the
taxtation method to relax the core condition to help communities, attract web services. We
have assigned ε to 15% of total community worth, ε = 0.15× v(C), which allows subsets
of the coalition to gain maximum 15% of v(C). In the optimal ε-core method, we capped
the coalition size to 25 web services, since the method is computationally intractable as
number of web services increase and anything more than that would make it impractical to
run in our simulations. In the other methods, there were no cap on size of the community
and we had communities of size 60 web services at some points. In this scenario our
1The implemented environment includes the QWS dataset by Eyhab Al-Masri and Qusay H. Mahmoud
freely available at: http://www.uoguelph.ca/~qmahmoud/qws/.
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Figure 3.4: Part (a): Cumulative number of requests successfully done. Part (b): Average
QoS of requests performed.
community receives 30 tasks on average per iteration, from users. The community, after the
task distribution process on each iteration, will reevaluate QoS metrics of its members and
can check for new membership requests. Web services may join or leave the community
between iterations. The results show that our depth-2 convex checker method is performing
better compared to the other methods and its performance is close to optimal ε-coremethod.
Our depth-1 convex checker and the 3-Way Satisfaction method, are also performing well.
As mentioned in Section 3.1, the concept of core, assumes no coalition of players can
gain anything by deviating, which is a fairly strong requirement, and that is why the notion
of ε-core was introduced. Least-Core e(G) of a game G, is the minimum amount of ε so
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Figure 3.5: Analysis of ε-core set non-emptiness, for different values of ε .
that the core is not empty. We evaluated the non-emptiness of ε-core set using the valuation
function and a set of web services. We picked random number of web services from the
dataset and formed around 10,000 random coalitions consisting of 3 to 26 web services. We
choose 26 as the maximum number of members in our coalition since it is computationally
very complex for larger coalitions to verify whether ε-core set is empty or not. Also instead
of considering ε amount of constant deviation in ε-core definition (Equation 2.4), we simi-
larly defined relative ε-core concept where no coalition would benefit more than ε × v(C)
by deviating. We set ε between 0 and 1 and verify the relative ε-core set non-emptiness.
The results in Figure 3.5 illustrates that almost 10% of our random web service coalitions
have non-empty core solution and ε-core solution is always non-empty when we let agents
gain only 30% more of v(C) by deviating.
One of the properties of coalition structure formation algorithms in our second sce-
nario is that they partition web services with low throughput rate so that they usually join
coalitions with less request rate. Since the characteristic function v(C) and the fair Shap-
ley payoff vector is proportional to web services’ contribution, the web services with small
contribution will get paid much less in communities having web services with high through-
put. On the other hand, according to the valuation function v(C), web services with high
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Figure 3.6: Part (a): Cumulative number of tasks succesfully done. Part (b): Average QoS
of tasks performed.
throughput will not contribute well to communities with low amount of user requests (low
market share). The strong web services are likely to deviate from weak coalitions, joining
a stronger one, which makes the initial coalition unstable.
In Figure 3.9, we compare our Web Services and many Communities scenario with
a method which ignores QoS parameters and forms coalitions by allowing web services
to join only if they have enough requests for themselves. In other words, web services
can join a community when the request rate is less than the throughput of all the member
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Figure 3.7: Analysis of community subsidizing coefficient λ on average community size
(a), cost (b), number of tasks performed (c), and average quality of service of tasks per-
formed (d).
web services. We name this method Random Formation and use it as a benchmark for our
QoS-aware coalition formation process. In this scenario, each user individually generates
randomly between 0 to 10 number of tasks per iteration, then the users target a community
and direct their requests to the chosen community. As the results illustrate, our method
forms better coalitions of web services improving performance and satisfaction for both
web services and coalitions.
As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, a solution to help the community stabilize is to sub-
sidize the community by a relative coefficient (λ ) so the value of λv(C) is divided among
the community members. We have analyzed the effect of subsidizing and the cost it incurs
to our web services communities. Figure 3.7 shows the results. In this experiment, we have
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set a community with input task rate RC of 100 and having web services throughput rate
Thws values from a normal distribution with average 10 tasks per iteration and standard de-
viation 2. Part (a) shows the community size increases in a linear fashion as (λ ) increases.
However, the cost (Part (b)) is having a slight exponential growth rate since, not only (λ )
increases, but also the size of the community is increasing slowly. Therefore, subsidizing
can be costly for larger number of λ values. Part (c) depicts the number of tasks done by
the community per iteration. It is obvious that with λ value of 1.3, which is 30% of the
community valuation, the number of tasks done almost reaches the input task rate cap of
100 tasks per iteration. The average quality of tasks also has a slight increase since the com-
munity will be able to afford better and more web services to join the community (Part (d)).
These results show the effectiveness of our subsidizing method and its impact on the QoS.
In fact, using more than 30% of the community valuation as subsidy is not very effective
and is costly to perform.
In our next scenario, we have introduced the new instability variable τ ranging from 0
to 1, 0 meaning web services having no instability issues and will perform as they claimed
until the end of the experiment, and 1 meaning very unstable web services, which will stop
functioning on the first iteration of the community distributing tasks. Figure 3.8 illustrates
the results of our experiment having web services with average instability values of 0 to 0.5
and having relative subsidy value λ of 1, 1.3, 1.6, and 2. The Cost/Income charts on the
right column show that having subsidy value of 1.3 incurs the least cost and increases the
community income significantly. Subsidy values of 1.6 and 2 yield high cost to the commu-
nity and only slightly increase the community revenue. Moreover, the role of subsidizing
is much more obvious when we have unstable web services. In scenarios where web ser-
vices are 100% stable, the subsidizing cost will hardly be compensated by the community
revenue.
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web services are stable, will not leave the group, and will fulfill their promised QoS for
a good period of time. However, in real world scenarios of web services, this is not al-
ways the case. This is the reason why the community coordinator would be interested in
paying web services in order to keep the group reliable from the end user’s point of view.




























































































































































































































Figure 3.8: Analysis of community subsidizing coefficient λ having web service different
stability levels of τ on average community size, number of tasks performed, average quality
of service, and average cost/income of communities.
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Figure 3.9: Part (a): Cumulative number of tasks successfully done. Part (b): Average QoS
of tasks performed.
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In Figure 3.9, we consider Web Services and many Communities scenario and we
compare our dynamic coalition formation solution with a method which ignores QoS pa-
rameters and forms communities by allowing web services to join only if they have enough
requests for themselves. In other words, web services can join a community when the re-
quest rate is less than the throughput of all the member web services. We name this method
Random Formation and use it as a benchmark for our QoS-aware community formation
process. In this scenario, each user individually generates randomly between 0 to 10 num-
ber of tasks per iteration, then the users target a community and direct their requests to the
chosen community. As the results illustrate, our method forms better communities of web
services improving performance and satisfaction for both web services and communities.
Finally, in our last experiment, we compare our model with the solution proposed
in [48], which we call High Availability Coalition model. In this method, the community
valuation function focuses on the community availability as main consideration. The com-
munity formation model used in this method is very different from ours, but we have been
very careful to make the experiment environment as fair and similar to ours as possible.
We limited our maximum community size to 5 in order to have communities with almost
the same size as in [48]. In the High Availability Coalition model, the authors have used
web services as backups rather than active collaborative players, and those web services
only get a task when the first web service in an ordered chain fails to perform that task.
Part(a) of Figure 3.10 shows that with our method, the number of tasks successfully done
is higher with a rate of three times more than the High Availability Coalition model thanks
to the cooperative behavior of web services and the task distribution process of our algo-
rithm. This result shows that using web services as backups, and not as real collaborative
players results in a considerable waste of web services capability since services have very
low chance of getting jobs and its the primary web service (the first in the coordination
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High Availability Coalition Method
Figure 3.10: A comparison between our community model and the High Availability Coali-
tion model from [48]. Part (a): Cumulative number of tasks successfully done. Part (b):
Average QoS of tasks performed. Part (c): Average community service availability.
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chain) which does most of the work. As shown in Part (b), the average quality of service
of tasks performed using our solution is also higher since our method considers all quality
of service metrics used. Part(c) shows the availability of communities from the end user’s
point of view. The High Availability Coalition model has almost 100% uptime since web
services are used as backups, so the chance of job failing is getting reduced significantly as
community members increase. In our method, we have more chance of failure for each web
service. However, with some subsidies and by hiring a few more web services, the chance
of failure of web services in our communities can be lowered.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a cooperative game theory-based model for the aggregation of
web services within communities. The goal of our services is to maximize efficiency by
collaborating and forming stable coalitions. Our method considers stability and fairness for
all web services within a community and offers an applicable mechanism for membership
requests and selection of web services. The ultimate goal is to increase revenue by improv-
ing user satisfaction, which comes from the ability to perform more tasks with high quality.
Simulation results show that our, polynomial in complexity, approximation algorithms pro-
vide web services and community owners with practical and near-optimal decision making
mechanisms.
In this chapter, we addressed the research questions R1, R2 and R3 that were in-
troduced in section 1.3. We assumed our web services and communities have complete
knowledge of all the other web services and their parameters. In the next chapter, we pro-




Distributed Decision Making for
Dynamic Formation of Web Services
Communities
4.1 Introduction
Given the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the Internet, delivering high quality services
is a critical and challenging issue. One practical solution towards delivering such quality
services is utilizing intelligent decision making agents. These agents aim at maximizing
their gain by exploring the best ways to provide services that satisfy end users [89, 52,
26, 91, 36]. However, agent-based web services are functionally limited in the sense that
they cannot handle a large number of requests at the same time without compromising the
quality of service provided. Recent developments have attempted to shift web services from
simple models, consisting of individual components, to models made up of autonomous
and group-based components that share common goals. In group-based models, interaction,
composition, and cooperation are the key challenges that directly impact the group’s overall
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performance in achieving common goals [69, 16, 12, 20]. To that end, we see the emergence
of web service communities, which consist of grouping services with similar functionalities
but distinct nonfunctional properties [89, 52, 66, 59]. A community of web services runs
continuous performance assessment functions that regulate web services’ interactions and
manage their composition and cooperation.
Web Services communities have the advantages of facilitating web service discov-
ery and providing better quality of service compared to individual services. Communities
act as abstract web services, communicating with external entities via the same standard
protocols that a normal web service employs. The difference is that communities regulate
the service process via sophisticated internal communication protocols, thereby providing
services based on the combined efforts of a number of web services. The downside to
communities is the complexity of management involved in finding and inviting adequate
individual services and managing the overall quality of the combined work of several ser-
vices. When interacting with a community of web services, users send their requests to the
coordinator of the community, which plays the role of community representative or access
point. The community coordinator is responsible of receiving tasks and delivering services.
Moreover, as community representative, it verifies the credentials of new web services be-
fore accepting them into the community and kicks services that could harm the value of the
community.
Challenges and Problem Statement. In recent work, communities of web services
have been proposed in order to facilitate discovery of web services, improve the Quality
of Service (QoS), and help individual services find better market share and opportunities
[89, 52, 66, 59]. However, two important challenges are to be addressed: 1) choice of the
best web services during community development from the community perspective; and
2) choice of the best community to join from the web service perspective. The advocated
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solutions [52, 51, 84, 48, 47, 41, 46] have attempted to address these challenges. However,
those solutions have two main limits:
1. The solutions consider the architecture of centralized management for communities
where most of the decisions are made by the centralized coordinator. The problem
is that in real world scenarios, decisions made by independent service providers are
highly distributed.
2. The solutions either propose complex algorithms [48, 46, 8] to find the optimal strat-
egy to follow, or oversimplify the problem by eliminating important parameters and
using approximation techniques to make the algorithms tractable [48].
These approximation methods sometimes negatively influence the outcome because sim-
plifying the constraints may cause important aspects of the problem to be ignored. For in-
stance, instead of calculating the gain distribution using the adequate, but complex shapley-
value method, the authors is [48] propose a simple egalitarian way of distributing gain,
which completely ignores the gain generated from collaborative work of sub-communities.
Other categories of related work, for instance [48, 41, 53], restrict the decision process
within the community coordinator, so other members of the community are not effectively
involved. In [8], we proposed a cooperative game-theory-based model for aggregating web
services in communities. A centralized decision maker in communities, based on a com-
plete knowledge of available web service quality metrics and performance, has been used
to form optimal and stable communities that maximize individual and group income. How-
ever, centrality and complete information are strong assumptions, which are not very com-
patible with real business scenarios.
Contributions. In this chapter, we introduce DDM, a Distributed Decision Making
model for community formation that regulates web service agents’ decision making process
in terms of cooperating and deciding which group to join and which service to invite for
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joining. Unlike existing work on community formation, our decision model is extracted
from a data model in the form of information obtained from a large number of web services
regarding their single and cooperative utilities as well as environmental parameters such as
demand, service quality, etc. The generated decision tree improves agents’ understanding of
the environment and how to select actions that lead towards maximizing their utilities. The
advantage of this approach is that the tree, which is initially created from the past data, re-
flects a comprehensive vision about agents’ attitudes in terms of their action selection based
on their past experiences. Moreover, the tree is getting continuously updated based on both
new received feedback and the outcome of chosen actions. This continuous update makes
the approach adapted to any change in the environment. The decision model provides web
services with enough information which helps those services efficiently decide and predict
the outcome of their different possible collaborations. This model works in a distributed
manner in which services are self-sufficient in their decision making and do not rely on a
centralized decision making process. Our findings show that communities of web services
can efficiently find the appropriate web service to invite for cooperation as well as allowing
a single web service to find the best communities to join. The proposed model can be seen
as a recommneder system that suggests beneficial actions for both communities and single
services. Communities can consider the decision model and analyze the characteristics of
different individual web services and make prudent decisions when inviting a web service
to join or accepting a join inquiry initiated from a web service. In general, DDM equips
web services with efficient methods for foreseeing how their choices will impact both their
short-term and long-term goals; therefore, opting for the best decision available.
To effectively generate the decision model for web services, we used a real dataset to
extract web services’ individual characteristics and used them to measure outcomes when
these services cooperate with one another. The dataset has been extracted from real-world
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QoS evaluation results from 142 users on 4,532 Web services during 64 different time slots.
Combining the available data based on each web service point of view on different time
slots, we acquired 5 different unique features for those 4,532 web services. By engineering
and extracting these features, we gathered functional and cooperative features for both in-
dividual web services and communities in different time slots. We were able to investigate
the path a web service might take to achieve the best utility out of effective interactions
with others. All the paths and outcomes are labeled to be utilized in the training model.
Using cross validation sets, web services are able to compute the optimal hypothesis func-
tion (using logistic regression) that can be used to predict outcomes of cooperative work
with other individual web services or communities. Our findings show that web services
equipped with DDM have by far better outcomes than the ones that either do not cooperate
or randomly find communities to join.
4.2 Challenging Issues
In this section, we introduce the challenges behind community formation.
4.2.1 The Join Challenge
It has been showed in [52, 48, 8] that web services can increase their overall utility by col-
laborating with other web services within communities. This collaboration provides them
with better ways of sharing resources and having higher reputation, greater market share
and wider visibility. Web services and communities come with different quality metrics,
and the long-term outcome depends on these metrics.
The goal of all parties involved in the community is to maximize their long-term out-
come while they are operating as part of the community. Web services need to be equipped
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with a selection strategy to choose from the different possible collaboration groups they can
form as well as an estimation method for evaluating the long-term gain of joining different
possible communities. Web services need to experiment with different possible collabora-
tive groups in order to estimate their gain over time. However, with a high number of pos-
sible communities, it is not possible to test collaboration with random web services. Even
if a linear approximate function for estimating utility based on community web services’
parameters is adopted, the exponential 1 growth rate of the possible number of partitions
of web services into communities would make any brute-force type algorithm for the best
community selection strategy intractable and impractical in real-world application settings.
4.2.2 Join Consequences
It is worth mentioning that a join event takes place as a result of interaction between two
parties that are looking to expand their collaborations. All actions are chosen in an attempt
to enhance the overall outcome. However, the selected action may result in decreasing the
overall utility in the long run. This is the case when a single web service joins a community,
but the complex process of task allocation eliminates the visibility of that service, which
stays idle within the community. This makes the join action of that service a bad decision.
The same event might be beneficial for the community, as it hosts a new web service that
can engage in performing a new coming task. But overall, in this particular case, if the new
web service stays idle for a long period of time, neither side will benefit from collaborating
with the other and the join event will result in negative consequences for at least one side’s
utility.
The more common scenario is when both parties benefit from the joining of a web
service to a community. This joining action is then rational as both the web service and
1Bell number: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_number
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community enhance their utilities. However, the community may not be the best choice
for the web service. In other words, the web service could have joined a better community
if it had enough and accurate knowledge about the surrounding environment. Since the
community does enhance its utility, the web service could stay with that community, which
results in a non-optimal increase in web service’s utility. In the following section, the
proposed model provides solutions that effectively address the aforementioned challenges.
4.3 Model Components
In this section, we discuss the parameters that we use in the rest of the chapter. Then, we
present the task distribution and revenue model of our distributed web services communi-
ties.
4.3.1 Internal Features
With a group of web services having identical or similar functionalities, QoS metrics pro-
vide nonfunctional characteristics for optimal candidate selection. Web services quality
metrics have been studied and analyzed in various proposals, for instance in in [6, 61, 90].
In this chapter, we adopt the most representative QoS properties of those services that highly
influence their utility.
Let C = {ws1,ws2, ...,wsn} be a community with n web services. We define the
following features for the group of web services based on their functional parameters:
• Throughput is the rate at which a service can process requests. QoS measures can
include the maximum throughput or a function that describes how throughput varies
with load intensity. Throughput is a positive real number. For a given community C,
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the expected throughput value (ThC) can be estimated as the summation of through-




• Availability is the percentage of time that a service is operating. It is computed as the
probability that the service operation is accessible. Availability of a web service Aw
is a real number in the range [0,1]. For a communityC, the expected availability (AC)
considering the members operate in parallel (independently from each other) can be
estimated as:
AC = 1− ∏
w∈C
(1−Aw) (4.2)
• Execution Time is the time a service takes to respond to various types of requests.
Execution time is usually measured in milliseconds and can be affected by load in-
tensity, which can be measured in terms of arrival rates (such as requests per second)
or number of concurrent requests. This internal feature is a positive integer. For a
typical community C, the expected execution time EtC can be estimated as the exe-
cution time of the bottleneck service which is the service with the slowest execution
time Etw:
EtC = maxw∈C(Etw) (4.3)
We normalize the range of these features so that each feature contributes proportion-
ally to the final utility outcome value. We adopt the standardization method consisting of




The quantitative values of quality metrics need some benchmark values to represent their
goodness. In fact, without some benchmark values, it would be difficult for web services
to identify their performance quality at any specific value of these metrics. Therefore, we
introduce two external features for assessing web services’ estimate with regard to their
standing among other web services.
• External Parameter 1 (Exp1i where i is a community or a web service) is an estimate
of how close the community’s or the web service’s execution time is to the best ex-
ecution time in the whole system. It is the difference between a community’s or a
web service’s execution time metric and the minimum value of execution time of all
the other communities or web services. The smaller the value the better the external
feature compared to other peers. In other words, small value of Exp1i means i is
among the best communities or services in the system.
Exp1i = Eti−Etmin (4.4)
• External Parameter 2 (Exp2i where i is a community or a web service) is a compari-
son of the community’s or the web service’s rate of performing tasks to the best rate
in the system. It is the difference between a community’s or a web service’s through-
put metric and the maximum value of throughput in the system. As for Exp1i, the
smaller the value the better the external feature.
Exp2i = Thmax−Thi (4.5)
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4.3.3 Task Distribution
Communities of web services usually employ an implementation of Contract-Net protocol
for task distribution, in which services bid on incoming tasks, and receive some of the tasks
for which they bid [53, 30]. In our model, our community members would try to distribute
tasks based on their capabilities and the QoS parameters provided by the web services. We
use a slightly modified weighted fair queuing method to distribute tasks among community
members. The goal is to allocate incoming tasks to web services with a rate matching the
throughput value of Thw for each web service w. In the weighted fair queuing method,
the input flow is multiplexed along different paths. However, in our model, if the rate of
incoming tasks is less than the community’s total throughput (ThC), which is the summation
of throughput values of the web services in the community, some of the input tasks will be
queued and served with a delay. When the incoming task rate is less than the throughput
of the community, the weighted fair queuing algorithm assigns a weighted task rate of
Itr× Thw
∑wThw
for each web service w within the community, where Itr is the input task rate.
While distributing tasks, the community can verify the performance, throughput and
quality of service of tasks being performed by web services. The community can assess if
those web services are capable of performing the number of tasks they advertised. If for any
reason, there is a decline in the quality metric or throughput, the community can consider
the new values as a benchmark for future performance calculations, and penalize the suspi-
cious web services. This way, players will have incentive to truthfully disclose their actual
capabilities in order to maximize profit from the community and to avoid being penalized.
In addition, the system should be dynamic enough to detect and react to web services’ qual-
ity metrics variation, as over time, web service metrics may degrade or improve, changes
to which the community should adjust.
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4.3.4 Community Revenue
Communities and web services earn revenue by performing tasks. The total gain is a func-
tion of the quality and rate of performing tasks. The utility of a collaborative group of
services UC (i.e., the revenue of the community) is a function of internal and external pa-
rameters:
UC = f (AC,EtC,Exp1C,Exp2C,ThC) (4.6)
where f is increasing in AC and ThC and decreasing in EtC,Exp1C and Exp2C. An example
of this function is given in Equation 4.7:
UC =
(
(α× (AC−EtC)−β × (exp1C+ exp2C)
)
×ThC (4.7)
The α and β parameters are internal and external weight coefficients. Small values
for execution time and external parameters ensure better performance, which justifies their
negative coefficients. The result is then multiplied by the throughput value ThC, since
communities are performing tasks with ThC rate.
Theorem 4.1. The function given in Equation 4.7 satisfies the properties of f .
The proof of this theorem is straightforward by simply calculating the partial deriva-
tive ∂ f with respect to the different variables.
The estimation of the utility can be improved, especially in cases where the input
task rate is high and services are experiencing high task loads. The weighted fair queu-
ing method of task distribution would distribute tasks based on the individual throughput
(Thw) value of services within community. In fact, services having higher throughput af-
fect strongly the overall utility of the community because they would take on proportionality
more tasks. The improved utility is given as a function of individual internal and external
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parameters:
UC = gw∈C(Aw,Etw,Exp1w,Exp2w,Thw) (4.8)
where gw∈C is increasing in Aw and Thw and decreasing in Etw,Exp1w and Exp2w. An









The following theorem holds:
Theorem 4.2. The function given in Equation 4.9 satisfies the properties of gw∈C.
4.4 Decision Making Mechanism
In this section, we describe our data extraction process and the methodology used to equip
web services and communities with a decision making mechanism. In this methodology, we
first present the data extraction and engineering process and then we evaluate the decision
making mechanism for web services in community settings. Figure 4.1 summarizes the
steps performed in DDM from the input data to the generation of decision making profiles
for web services and communities. The objective is to use the input data to build a decision
tree for each service and community included in the data set, which will be be served as a
benchmark for other services and communities in their decision making mechanism. The
decision tree is made up by training the real data obtained from operating web services
and extracting features related to their performance, either alone or as part of a joint effort
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1) Input Data 2) Feature 
Extraction
3) Feature Engineering 





Services with DDM 
Decision Profiles
Phase (B): Decision Profile Generation
Phase (A): Data Extraction and Solution Engineering
Figure 4.1: A summary of DDM decision profile generation steps.
with other web services. The ultimate objective is to propose for each web service and
community the best joint decision about forming a group that maximizes every one’s utility.
The DDM’s steps are explained in the following sections.
4.4.1 Data Extraction and Solution Engineering
A. Input Web Services Data
Each web service is associated with a number of quality metrics that reflect its non
functional parameters. These web services operate in an online environment and are con-
tinuously assigned tasks to handle. We used the web services data set provided in [90].
The raw data provides real-world QoS evaluation results from several users on 5,825 web
services over 64 different time frames2. Using this data, we built a synthetic data set that
contains features of a large number of web services and communities in different time inter-
vals. The goal is to use the data set to train a decision-making model that adopts the trend























Figure 4.2: Communities with different properties of web services actively looking for other
communities to collaborate with.
B. Feature Extraction
By processing the data provided for each web service over different time slots, we
obtain the three internal quality features introduced in Section 4.3.1: throughput, availabil-
ity and execution time and the two external features discussed in Section 4.3.2. In fact, web
services and communities are represented using feature vectors of these five internal and
external features.
We formulate a Community Feature Vector (CFV) as CFV<C> = [ f1, ... f5] having
a community of k web services (C = {ws1, ...wsk}, k ≥ 1)
3. The features f1 through f5
3A web service is considered as a community of one web service.
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represent the execution time, throughput, availability and the external parameters 1 and
2 respectively. A set of communities, with their feature vectors and utilities evaluated,
provides our algorithm with a raw training data set. We call this set of communities the
template vector CS, and the set of feature vectors associated with the template vector is
referred to as the community feature vector set (CFVS). Figure 4.2 depicts web services and
communities looking to form new groups in order to improve their utility gain.
C. Feature Engineering
Let CFVS = {CFV<C1>, . . . ,CFV<CN>} be the community feature vector set with N
communities. Based on the CFVS set, we create an |N ×N| gain matrix gaint for each
time slot t. Each entry gaintn,m corresponds to a utility gain of community Cn when it joins





−U tCn where U
t
Cn∪Cm
and U tCn are the utilities at time t computed using Equation 4.9. Evaluating the utility gain
for all entries of the gaint matrix is a computationally heavy process when N, the size of
the feature vector set, is large. Therefore, this size should be chosen carefully.
Table 4.1: An example of gain matrix for 3 different communities and their combinations.
<348> <1934> <2117> <348, 1934> <1934, 2117> <348, 1934, 2117>
<348> - 0.282708 1.027081 0.282708 18.027081 18.027081
<1934> -2.637483 - 6.969072 -2.637483 5.509583 4.387725
<2117> 5.027081 2.969072 - 5.509583 2.969072 5.509583
<348, 1934> 0.0 0.0 -3.851432 - -3.851432 -3.851432
<1934, 2117> 2.969072 0.0 0.0 2.969072 - 2.969072
<348, 1934, 2117> 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Each community is provided with the corresponding row of data from the gaint ma-
trix. Basically, Ci is provided with the data in row i of this matrix, which reports all the
possible utility valuesCi can gain by joining different communities. By ordering the utility
gain values of the row, each community is equipped with an ordered set of preferences over











i . . . Cn be an ordered sequence of preferences
for community Ci at time t. Based on this sequence, we define K
t(Ci,k) as a set of the k






i Cy ∀Cy ∈CS ∧ Cx 6=Cy ∧ Cy /∈ K
t(Ci,k−1)
} (4.10)
Based on Kt(Ci,k), we define a set of communitiesC j forCi which are the k most preferred
communities forCi andCi belongs to the kmost preferred communities ofC j. This basically
yields the preference in both sides.
Lt(Ci,k) =
{
C j|C j ∈ K




Table 4.1 illustrates an example of a gainmatrix for 3 different communities and their
combinations. Each row shows the gain the community can achieve by collaborating with
other 5 communities. In this example, for community < 348> we have:
K(< 348>,1) = {< 1934,2117>} and
K(< 348>,2) = {< 1934,2117>,< 1934>}
Since< 348> is the best preferred community of< 1934,2117> and vice versa, therefore
L(< 348>,1) is not empty and contains the community < 1934,2117>.
Using the gain matrix and the mentioned preference ordering relations, we are able
to build a decision tree where the list of possible communities to join and their expected
utilities are set. In addition to the best choice, web services have access to other ordered
choices and can look for the second best or third best if their first try is rejected by the
target community. This aspect is analyzed in more detail in the following section, in which
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we launch experiments and investigate the effectiveness of the use of a decision tree with
different decision layers in joining other communities and enhancing the overall utility.
4.4.2 Decision Profile Generation
Our goal is to create a decision making profile for each community in theCFVS set. We are
creating an environment where the communities can experience the outcomes of different
strategies. The result will be a decision tree of the feasible and utility-increasing moves
over time. The root of the decision tree represents a community in the CFVS set, and the
other nodes represent the communities resulting from the parent node’s action of joining
them along with their feature values and expected utility.
We let communities pick the best communities maximizing their utilities over differ-
ent time frames. At time t = 1, we let each community in the CFVS set choose the best
community, which is a single community in the set {C j}= K
t(Ci,1). If communityC j also
ranks Ci to be the highest preferred community to join, meaning the set L
t(Ci,k = 1) is not
empty, they would join each other. Having set k = 1 is a very strict and hardly satisfiable
condition. In order to relax the requirement, we increase the value of k by a rate r propor-
tional to time slot t: k= 1+ |r× t|. On early steps of the training process, web services and
communities are more strict, but as time goes on, we let them choose second and then third
best options too. However, increasing k increases the time complexity as well.
When communities Ci and C j are in each other’s top k preference set, the new com-
bined community, i.e., Ci ∪C j is added to the list of possible communities that can join
others at time t+1. Moreover, for each communityCi in our initialCFVS set, we maintain
a tree with the community Ci as its root. Its children are all the communities that Ci de-
cided to join. As the scenario progresses over time, the merged communities may decide to
join other communities. When communities Ci and C j decide to join each other and create
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community Ck, the new community Ck will be added as a child to both Ci and C j nodes.
At the end of the process, each community is utilized with a tree representing all possible
combinations of communities it can join. Algorithm 1 illustrates the DDM tree creation
procedure as pseudo-code.
Algorithm 1: DDM DECISION TREE ALGORITHM.
Input: 〈r,gaintn,n,CFVS〉 learning rate r, |N×N×T | gain matrix, community
feature vector
Output: A set of root nodes of the decision trees
1 k← 1
2 nodes[N]← initialize N tree nodes representing each community in CFVS
3 for t ← 1 to T do
4 k← 1+ round(r× t)
5 for all Ci ∈CFVS do
6 for all C j ∈ L
t(Ci,k) do
7 ifCi ∈ L
t(C j,k) then
8 Ck ←Ci∪C j
9 addCk toCFVS set




Having created |n| trees, one per community, our communities are utilized with the
different possible paths they can take to maximize their utilities. Using a distance function4,
communities and web services outside the training set can find the community that closely
resembles their parameters within theCFVS set. Those new communities can use the trees
of the closest communities in the training set to have an estimation of the outcome of all
possible joining actions they can take. By so doing, new communities can request to join
the best communities which will maximize their gain. Such a request is most likely to be
accepted as the decision considers the preferences and utility gain of the other side as well.
4See Section 4.5 for an example of this function.
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Figure 4.3: A partial view of a decision tree created by DDM.
As a real scenario example from the used data set, Figure 4.3 depicts a snapshot from
a decision tree created by the DDM algorithm for a particular singleton community C1273.
This tree shows the different communities thatC1273 has experienced with during the train-
ing process. Each line shows the web services list within a community, the community’s
feature vector and the last value on each line is the overall gained utility of the community.
Complexity. Here we analyze the computational complexity of the DDM decision
tree creation algorithm on each time iteration t. Computing top k preferred communities
for Ci in K
t(Ci,k) requires O(n.log(n)) sort time. The size of K
t(Ci,k) is k, and for each
of those k communities, we need to check against their k top preferred communities, which
needs O(k2). Line 5 iterates through n communities, Line 6 takes O(n.log(n)) to compute
and iterates k times, and considering we already have the list sorted, Line 7 can reuse the
sorted preferences. Thus, Line 7 takes O(k) time to check if Ci is member of K
t(Ci,k).
Multiplying these iterations, the order of complexity of the algorithm with regard to n and
k for each time slot is: O(k2× n2.log(n)). Since the whole algorithm runs T times, the
overall complexity is O(T × k2×n2.log(n)).
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4.5 Experiments
We implemented DDM in Java5. We recall that we have extracted the set of features for
4532 web services in 64 different time slots through a data set provided in [90]. By ran-
domly choosing 86 web services out of this data set for each run, and selecting a subset
of all possible combinations of sizes 2, 3, and 4 of these 86 web services, we have been
able to create 10,000 communities and evaluated the feature vectors and utilities they can
have in the 64 time slots. This provides us with the initial training feature set of size
|CFVS| = 10,000 communities. Based on Equation 4.9, the utilities of these communities
are estimated, and then the gain matrix of size |10,000× 10,000| of all possible ways of
merging these 10,000 communities is generated6. Based on the gain matrix, each commu-
nity has an ordered preference among other communities in the set.
We let communities and web services adopt their strategies based on our DDM de-
cision making mechanism. Based on the decisions adopted, each community will generate
a decision tree profile. We let DDM run four times with different r rates of 0.05, 0.07,
0.10 and 0.20. With the slow rate of r = 0.05, we increase k in Equation 4.7 for every 20
time frames, which will happen only three times in our 64-step experiment. In the case of
r= 0.20, k increases much faster, at a rate of once every 5 time frames, which increases the
complexity of the Lt(Ci,k) search for each community in theCFVS set.
Table 4.2 depicts the average utility gain value of the communities in each of the
four runs. The utility gain is the increase of utility the communities gain by cooperating
and joining other communities. The utility gain ratio is the ratio of their final utility over
initial utility. Comparing the different search rates, we can see that increasing the value
of r from 0.05 to 0.10 results in a significant performance boost. However, higher rates
5Source code of implementation and data is available at: https://github.com/Marooned202/DDM
6The template vector and gain matrix generated are available at https://github.com/Marooned202/
DDM/tree/master/wsds/data/run
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of r (r > 0.10) are not increasing the chance of finding better collaborative groups for our
communities while unnecessarily increasing the search complexity.
Table 4.2: Utility gain of web services after making collaborative groups based on DDM
algorithm with different r rates.





The closest related work [48, 46, 41] and our previous work [8] regarding the commu-
nity formation problem have considered a centralized approach where a community man-
ager has complete information of all the web services and their quality metric and param-
eters. Those proposals run complex algorithms through all the space of solutions in order
to find the optimal answer. However, in this research work, we have considered an unex-
plored and more realistic situation where information is incomplete and a decision profile is
generated based on a smaller set of web services. Our solution helps communities and web
services select actions that lead towards maximizing their utilities. Therefore, consider-
ing the different settings, we cannot experimentally compare our work with the mentioned
related work.
To compare our work against a benchmark, we utilize the same communities and
web services with a simple rational decision making mechanism in which a community
will choose to join another one if it increases its utility by any amount, without aiming to be
optimal. We call this method the rationalmethod. We have chosen 10 random web services
and compared the results with web services which adopted our DDM model. Figure 4.4
shows the comparison of the end result of utility gain values. In 18 out of 40 tries, rational
agents were not able to improve their utility at all because the communities they chose
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Figure 4.4: DDM against Rational: utility gain.
rejected their request, most likely because they would not have increased the utility of the
other communities if they had joined them. The results show that a long-term strategic
decision mechanism is needed to satisfy all the services within communities. Figure 4.5
shows the same results in terms of ratio of utility gain.
Now, we evaluate the performance of the decision profiles generated based on our
data set for other communities.We create 1,000 communities from the web services in the
data set that were not involved in the training process of our decision model. We define
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Figure 4.5: DDM against Rational: ratio of utility gain.
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a distance function that measures the difference between basic features of communities,
which measures the similarity among communities.
distance(C1,C2) = |ThC1−ThC2 |
+ |AC1−AC2 |+ |EtC1−EtC2 |
(4.12)
Now, each community tries to find the closest community within the trained CFVS
set. Following its decision profile, the community can get a good estimate of the possible
strategic decisions it can adopt. Basically, the trained profiles benefit the new communities
in two ways. First, they provide the communities with a set of viable communities to join.
Second, they provide an estimation of long-term utility gain for each available decision.
In this experiment, we let communities follow the best decision within the decision tree
provided to them.
In order to evaluate the performance of the mechanism, we used Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve, which is a graphical plot illustrating the true negative rate
against the false positive rate at various threshold settings in classifier systems. In order to
classify our communities’ selection strategies correctly, for each community, we evaluated
the training process by replacing the community in the set with the closest one, from which
it gets the strategy profile. If the actions are the same and the same utility levels are gained,
we classify the decision as correct. Otherwise, it is classified as a wrong decision. AUC, the
area under the ROC curve, is equal to the probability that a classifier will rank a randomly
chosen positive instance higher than a randomly chosen negative one, and the higher the
number the better the solution, which reflects better performance. Figure 4.6 illustrates
the ROC curve evaluation of the DDM decision making mechanism. As benchmark, we
compare our method with two other methods: the rational method and the greedy method.
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The greedy method only looks up the available list of communities and simply joins the
community that maximizes its utility without considering any long-term strategy or other
communities’ acceptance scenarios. It is a greedy algorithm that focuses on choosing a
locally optimal choice.
• Rational Method: Communities would send a join request to any available commu-
nity, which will increase the utility. The other community would accept the join offer
if its own utility gain is positive as well.
• Greedy Method: Communities do a linear search among all the available communi-
ties and send a join request to the community which results in maximum utility. The
other community would accept the join offer if its own utility gain is positive and the
utility gain does not need to be the maximum for the community receiving the join
request.
Figure 4.6 compares the results for all the methods. The rational and greedymethods
have very high failure rates compared to our method. Table 4.3 illustrates the number of
communities that failed to find the optimal collaboration group. The results support the
need for a long-term training model in a successful decision making process.









Now, we evaluate the system-specific results from users’ and communities’ perspec-
tives. By distributing tasks among the communities over the 64 time frames, we evaluate
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Figure 4.6: RoC Curve.
the revenue for each community. Figure 4.7 shows the overall revenue gain of communities
using our method. Figure 4.8 shows the momentarily revenue gain for each community
in each time slot compared to the previous time. These results show that the run with the
higher learning rate of r = 0.20 starts discovering better communities to join much earlier.
The runs with slow rates seem to find some communities to join initially, but then they slow
down until later, when they start discovering new communities to join.
Figure 4.9 depicts the average community size over time, which essentially represents
the number of new communities being formed. The results show once again the communi-
ties using DDM with higher search rates grow faster in size, implying that the communities
find appropriate web services to join with faster.
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Figure 4.7: Overall utility of all the communities.
























Figure 4.8: Utility gain over time.
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Figure 4.9: Average community size.
4.6 Summary
In this research work, we proposed a training model for the problem of membership man-
agement of communities of web services. Using the training model, we created a decision
making profile for each community and web service involved which provides them with a
set of feasible and utility increasing moves. This utilized our web services with efficient
methods of foreseeing how their choices of actions would impact their long-term and short-
term goals, which allowed them to make better decisions. The ultimate goal is to choose the
best decision when it comes to communities formation, among many possible short-term
rational and utility increasing choices. The experimental results show that our algorithms
provide web services and community owners, in real-world-like environments, with ap-
plicable and near-perfect decision making mechanisms. The results of experiments using
real data samples support the need for a long-term training model in a successful decision
making process.
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In this chapter, we addressed the research questions R4 and R5 that were introduced
in section 1.3. In the next chapter, we analyse the internal community behavior of web ser-




Coopetitive Behavior of Services within
Communities
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, our focus was on community formation and we emphasized cooper-
ative behavior of the web services as agents. Within communities, the web services, selfish
and utility maximizers by nature, can follow two different strategies, namely cooperation
and competition in order to increase their payoffs when they provide services to consumers
[50]. In typical business settings, services are used to compete within communities as they
provide the same functionalities and the number of users requests is finite. However, the
same reason of providing similar functionalities can lead services to cooperate because they
can replace each other in case of failure or unavailability, and services can do better in a
coalition structure. Analyzing services competition and cooperation strategies within com-
munities is still an open problem that motivates the research described in this section. We
propose a mechanism within which service agents in the community could choose either
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to compete for an announced task1, or to cooperate with other competing services in the
same community to accomplish some subtasks of the announced task. We equip intelligent
web services to follow a reasoning technique to choose best interactive strategy (Coopeti-
tive attitude, which is categorized to compete and cooperate). In the proposed system, we
explore details behind the strategic decision making procedures and enable service agents
to apply different techniques to constrain high efficiency and obtain the maximum utility.
We investigate services’ expected payoffs and the involved probabilities that are used to
choose over the two interacting strategies.
Here, we first present the architecture of the proposed model. We explore the char-
acteristics of intelligent service agents and their network. We link this architecture to the
implemented system where we investigate the services’ coopetitive attitudes. We compute
the involved system parameters and explain the services’ interactive strategy profiles by























Web services  not 
involved in any 
collaboration
Figure 5.1: Services are partitioned into competitive and cooperative sets. Competitive
services may get tasks directly from the master agent and they can share it with other coop-
erative services in their collaborative networks within the same community.
1Requests and tasks are used in this report interchangeably.
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5.2 Architecture
Figure 5.1 illustrates the architecture of a typical community aggregating a number of ser-
vices with different interactive strategies. Some of them compete for the task where they
directly deal with the master. Some others cooperate in the associated task where they
only deal with the competed service as the task leader and do not directly interact with
the master (the master deals only with the service that has bid for the task, which is re-
sponsible of choosing its collaborative network). In both sets, some service agents are for
certain moments out of any collaboration network. Upon allocation of the task, the service
is responsible for offering the required QoS that is stated in the task being generated by a
consumer. Afterwards, the master rewards or penalizes the competing service by upgrading
or degrading its reputation according to the offered QoS compared with the required one.
This comparison influences the sorting mechanism used by the master to allocate the tasks
in further task allocation rounds.
5.3 System Parameters
In this section, we demonstrate the parameters involved and their corresponding formula-
tions and explanations.
Task QoS (T rQoS) is the required QoS metric for a specific task r. Users define tasks
with specific QoS requirements such as response time, availability, and successability (or
accuracy). We aggregate and normalize these metrics to a value between 0 and 1.
Service QoS (QoSrw) is the QoS provided by the service w after performing the task
r. Again, the metrics that contribute in computing this QoS are aggregated and normalized
to a value between 0 and 1. The offered quality might or might not meet the required
task quality T rQoS. In the latter case, the service user would be disappointed and a negative
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satisfaction feedback is expected. In our proposed system, both cases are considered when
calculating the services’ reputation.
Budget (Btw) is the amount of money the service agent w has in its disposal during the
window time t (i.e., [0, t]), which helps pay for the community membership fees (ε) and is
one of the parameters that the service agent considers when deciding about getting involved
in a competition or not.
Reputation (Reptw) is a significant factor in any online community [31]. Without
a reputation enabling mechanism, users cannot differentiate among services, specially the
ones which offer the same type of service. Reputation mechanisms usually aggregate users’
experiences and in our case it strongly depends on QoS that each service provides. Users
define tasks, each one with specific quality T rQoS, so that after performing a certain number
of tasks, each one with QoSrw, during a window time t, the reputation of w gets evaluated
by the master agent. Reptw refers to the reputation of w during that window time t.
In Equation 5.1, we compute the reward that the master computes considering the
task r’s QoS T rQoS compared with the service offered quality QoS
r
w. In case the offered
quality meets user expectations, the reward value would be positive. In this system, we
consider a small value as default rewards η which the master considers together with the
proportional level of satisfaction as a weighted value (by υ). In this case, the higher the
offered quality, the more weighted reward. In case the offered quality did not meet the
user expectations, the reward would be negative. A default penalty value ρ (where ρ > η)
together with the weighted proportional difference are therefore considered. The idea is
to harshly penalize the services rather than rewarding them. To this end, rational service
agents should carefully analyze their capabilities once the available tasks are announced.
Equation 5.2 computes the obtained reward by w during the window time t considering the
set tasktw of tasks performed by w during the window time t. In our proposal, service agents
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have the goal of increasing their budget, which is directly related to their reputation. Thus,

























if tasktw 6= /0;
0 otherwise.
(5.2)
The assigned reputation value is updated by the computed reward value. The com-
puted reputation of services is bounded by the minimum and maximum reputation values 0
and 1. Let Γ = Reptw+reward
t




Γ if 0≤ Γ≤ 1;
0 if Γ < 0;
1 if Γ > 1.
(5.3)
For new services with no previous reputation value, we use the bootstrapping trust technique
proposed in [87]. This technique consists in giving the new services a chance and observe
their behaviors for a period of testing time. The observation sequence is modeled as a
hidden Markov model that is used to detect the behavior of the service by comparing the
observation behavior against pre-defined trust patterns. Based on the matching result, an
initial value is assigned to the service. Using this initial reputation value, services quickly
converge to their actual and stable values using the update function.
Proposition 5.1. Reptw can be computed in time O(|t|), i.e., in time linear in the size of the
window t.
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Proof. 2 The function Reptw is recursive on t, but the algorithm works by storing the last
calculated reputation value in a variable, so it will not be recalculated again at each itera-
tion. However, the calculation of rewardtw is needed. Since the function reward
t
w can be
computed in time linear in the number of tasks (see Equations 5.1 and 5.2), which in turn is
linear in the size of the window time, the result follows. 
Growth Factor (Gtw) is a parameter which declares services’ performance based on
their recent strategies and activities. Growth factor is relative to services’ reputation Reptw,
QoS during the window time t QoStw, and budget B
t
w. This factor is the main variable
a typical service uses to decide about which strategy to adopt. We use Equation 5.4 to
compute the growth factor Gtw of the service w during the window time t as the average of
the three aforementioned parameters, where nt is the total number of offered tasks to the
whole community during the window time t, µw is the mean received service fee, and ε is

















if tasktw 6= /0;
0 otherwise.
This equation is designed so that it satisfies the following desirable properties:
1. The growth factor function should be monotonically increasing in the offered quality
of service QoStw.
2. The growth factor function should be monotonically increasing in the service’s repu-
tation Reptw.
2In this work, we assume that the common arithmetic and elementary functions, such as multiplication,
division and trigonometric functions can be computed in time O(1) as they operate on inputs of fixed sizes.
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3. The growth factor function should be monotonically increasing in the budget Btw if
the maximum possible profit is positive and monotonically decreasing in Btw if the
maximum possible profit is negative. This property reflects the idea that the budget
contributes in the increase of the growth factor as far as there is a chance to make
profit. In fact, the contribution of the budget Btw in the calculation of the growth
factor should be proportional to the maximum possible profit ntµw− ε where the
service w receives all the offered tasks during the window time t.
It is easy to show that Equation 5.4 satisfies the three aforementioned properties by


















). Thus, the sign of the two first partial deriva-
tives is positive and the sign of
∂Gtw
∂Btw
depends on the sign of the maximum profit ntµw− ε ,
so we are done. The mean service fee depends on the strategy adopted by the service be-
cause a competitive service receives higher fees µw,CM compared to a cooperative one µw,CO
(µw,CM > µw,CO). The motivation behind this is that a competitive service for a given task
is the leader for that task while other cooperative services are performing specific subtasks
as asked by the leader.
Proposition 5.2. Gtw can be computed in time linear in the size of the window t.
Proof. As shown in the second part of Equation 5.4, the function QoStw can be computed
in time linear in the number of tasks, which in turn is linear in the size of the window time.
Since Btw is constant, the result follows from Proposition 5.1. 
The above explained parameters and other additional parameters which will be used
in the rest of this chapter are listed and self explained in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: List of abbreviations.
Notation Definition Notation Definition
T rQoS Required task QoS for the task r T
t
QoS Mean required task QoS during t
QoSrw Service w QoS for the task r QoS
t
w w QoS during the window time t
Rewardrw Reward obtained by w w.r.t. r Reward
t
w Reward to update the reputation
Reptw Reputation assigned for w B
t
w Budget associated to service w
Gtw Growth factor of w during t ε Community membership fee
pitw,CM Competition payoff of w pi
t
w,CO Cooperation payoff of w
ptw,CM Competition probability of w p
t
w,CO Cooperation probability of w
COF tw Cooperation fee of w βw Profit of w
µw,CM Mean service fee for competing w µw,CO Mean service fee for cooperating w
τ tw Coopetitive threshold of w P
t
w Probability of competing for w
U tw Utility of w E
t
w Expected number of tasks
5.4 Service Interactive Strategies
The main goal of each individual service agent is to increase its income (payoff). This in-
come can be earned from tasks (or requests) done by this service. In our model, services
can decide to compete to get a task from the master agent or to cooperate with other services
within a given collaborative network (the way a collaborative network is set by a leader is
based on the cooperative services reputation and their QoS parameters that should coincide
with the required QoS). Therefore we define two types of service strategies. First, when a
service has higher level of confidence based on its growth factor, it can compete to get a
task from the master and adopts the competitive strategy. Second, when the service agent
has a lower level of confidence that it does not feel capable to compete, it waits for some
other services to cooperate with to perform some tasks 3, and thus it adopts the cooperative
strategy. Services estimate the outcome of all the strategies and choose one of them ac-
cordingly. This decision is not static but can change over time so service agents can switch
from one strategy to the other, and this dynamic attitude is referred to as coopetition. The
underlying decision making process is presented in the next section.
3Through the report, requests or tasks are supposed to be decomposable.
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5.5 Theoretical Results
5.5.1 Service Decision Making Procedure
In this section, we explore in details the interaction strategies and the outcome of each strat-
egy in terms of services’ utilities. The main part of services’ decision making procedure
falls into their growth factor analysis. In fact, the comparison of the growth factor to a
particular threshold is the main reason that influences the service’s decision to follow ei-
ther competitive or cooperative behavior. service agents initially compute this value and
compare it with their computed threshold. Generally the main challenge is the threshold
computation and we cope with this issue in the rest of this section. We additionally use
the obtained results in the implemented environment and analyze their effectiveness on ser-
vices’ strategic decision making procedures.
Figure 5.2 shows the decision making process that is followed by a typical service. In
case the service agent is ready to compete, there is a chance that it bids for a task if it has the
required capabilities to accomplish that task, or stays silent and returns to the cooperative
status. But in case the service agent is willing to cooperate, it has to wait for a cooperation
opportunity that could be triggered by another service agent that competed and obtained
the task, so both services will be part of the same collaborative network. In the decision
making process presented in Figure 5.2, we assume that the competing service might get the
task (denoted as Bid/obtainedTask) or not in case of being rejected by the master agent,
or do not even bid for the task (denoted as Silent/re jectedTask). For simplicity reasons
and without loss of generality, we group the two cases of Bids and obtainedTask together
as well as Silent and re jectedTask. The rational behind this aggregation is the fact that our
main concentration is services’ status (competitive or cooperative) over different decision
making rounds, which could be caused by internal factors (the services) or by the external
98













Figure 5.2: Decision making process over competitive and cooperative strategies.
Consider a service w that is willing to compete for the period of time t (that means
the computed growth factor is more than the analyzed threshold). This service can esti-
mate the expected payoff associated to this decision, called competition payoff. Equation
5.5 computes this expected payoff for the competing service w (pitw,CM) considering the














In Equation 5.5, Etw is the number of tasks that w expects during the window time t,
and µw,CM is the mean service fee that is assigned by the master agent to w. This means that
a competing service directly obtains this fee from the master agent. Moreover, the com-
peting service w expects a cooperation fee (COF tw) that it gives to its collaborators in case
w needs to cooperate with other services (cooperative service agents in its collaboration
network). In any case, the competing or cooperating service agent pays a fixed amount of
membership (ε) to the master agent, which plays the role of the community’s coordinator.
This fee would be taken into account when a service decides to leave to a cheaper commu-
nity or act alone. But to concentrate on the main concerns of this thesis, we skip these small
details.
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From Equation 5.5, the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 5.3. The complexity of computing the competition payoff pitw,CM is linear in the
competition probability ptw,CM, the expected number of tasks E
t
w, and the cooperation fee
COF tw.
The arrival of requests for service w during the time unit t (denoted here by mw(t))
can be modeled as a nonhomogeneous Poisson process [42, 73], which means as a Poisson
process with dynamic arrival rate λw(x) where x belongs to the time unit t. The arrival rate
is thus a function of time and typically varies significantly from moment to moment. In





And the probability of having exactly n requests during the window t is computed as fol-
lows:




Let Maxtw be the maximum number of requests that w can receive during t. The number of
expected requests Etw is given by the parameter λw(t) as follows:




n p(mw(t) = n) (5.6)
The parameter λw(t) is usually estimated from data samples using the least squares, iterative
least squares, or maximum likelihood [57].
Proposition 5.4. The complexity of computing the expected number of requests Etw is linear
in the size of the window time t.
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Proof. For a fixed function λw(x), mw(t) can be computed in O(1). Thus, from Equation




w is linear in t, the
result follows. 
Similar to the competitive service case, if a service w declares cooperative status,
its expected cooperation payoff (pitw,CO) is computed in Equation 5.7. In this equation,
ptw,CO is the probability of getting involved in a cooperative task with other services and
1− ptw,CO is the probability of failure to find such a cooperation opportunity. These two
probabilities are set when w decides to compete. We recall that µw,CO denotes the mean
cooperation fee that is directly obtained from the leader (i.e., the competitive) service of
the underlying collaborative network. Compared to µw,CM, µw,CO is relatively smaller since









From Equation 5.7, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5.5. The complexity of computing the cooperation payoff pitw,CO is linear in the
cooperation probability ptw,CO and the expected number of tasks E
t
w.
To analyze the expected payoffs obtained from different strategies, services need
to compute the estimated probabilities that distinguish subcases in each behaviorial sta-
tus (ptw,CM for competitive and p
t
w,CO for cooperative). To estimate these probabilities, we
should notice that they are functions of services’ reputation values (Reptw). Furthermore,
ptw,CM is also function of the difference between the offered QoS (QoS
t
w) and the mean
requested one considering the set of all tasks taskt (T tQoS (see Equation 5.8)); and p
t
w,CO is
function of the reputation of other services in the community because the leader is supposed
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to be selective when it comes to choose the collaborators. To this end, we first discuss the
desirable properties of an estimation function of each of these probabilities, and show that











Proposition 5.6. T tQoS can be computed in time linear in the size of the window t.
Proof. From Equation 5.8, T tQoS can be computed in time linear in |task
t |, which in turn is
linear in the window size |t|. 
The desired properties of ptw,CM are as follows:
















T tQoS is positive.





Property 5.4. The increase slope of ptw,CM is higher when the reputation Rep
t
w increases in
the interval [0,0.5] than when it increases in the interval ]0.5,1].
Property 1 simply says that the probability of success competition ptw,CM can be always




QoS are available. Property 2 says that the reputation
and QoS are two key factors that influence the value of ptw,CM in the sense of positive
correlation. Property 3 indicates that the probability ptw,CM is null if the offered QoS is less
than the expectation. Property 4 promotes the increase of the reputation for new comers and
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imposes higher increase rate at the beginning of the reputation curve because it is always
hard to build the reputation, but once it is built, its maintenance is less challenging.
The desired properties of ptw,CO are as follows:
Property 5.5. ptw,CO is continuous with regard to Rep
t
w and the reputation of other services
in the community.
Property 5.6. ptw,CO is monotonically increasing in Rep
t
w and monotonically decreasing in
the community average reputation.
Property 5.7. The increase slope of ptw,CO is higher when the reputation Rep
t
w increases in
the interval [0,0.5] than when it increases in the interval ]0.5,1].
Property 5 is similar to Property 1. Property 6 says that w has more chance to get involved
in a cooperation if it has high reputation compared to the other members. This chance
decreases if other services have higher reputation. Property 7 is similar to Property 4.
Equations 5.9 and 5.10 respectively compute the estimated success probability in
cases where service w is competing and cooperating. These values are computed con-
sidering service’s reputation value (Reptw computed by the master), service’s offered QoS
(QoStw), the task required QoS (T
t
QoS), which is the mean required QoS computed from pre-
vious tasks, the maximum offered QoS (QoStk, which is provided by another competitive
service k), and the cooperative factor CLtw of service w during the window time t, which

































Theorem 5.1. Equation 5.9 satisfies Properties 1 to 4.

















is positive as the function cos (the
derivative of sin) is positive on [0, pi
2




QoS. The partial deriva-

















) is also positive
since Qostk−T
t







] and sin is positive on [0, pi
2
], which proves the
satisfaction of Property 2. Property 3 is straightforward. Finally, the increase slope of the
function sin on [0, pi
2
] proves Property 4. 
Theorem 5.2. Equation 5.10 satisfies Properties 5 to 7.
Proof. We can easily show the continuity of Equation 5.10 from which Property 5 fol-
lows. Property 6 can be shown by calculating the partial derivative ∂ ptw,CO first with regard
to Reptw and second with regard to the community C average reputation ∑k∈C Rep
t
k/|C |,
















) is negative, which proves
the satisfaction of Property 6. The proof of satisfaction of Property 7 is similar to the one
of Property 4. 
Proposition 5.7. ptw,CM can be computed in time linear in the window size |t|.
Proof. The result follows directly from 1) Equation 5.9; 2) Proposition 5.1 (Complexity of
Reptw is linear in the window size |t|); 3) second part of Equation 5.4 (the function QoS
t
w
can be computed in time linear in the number of tasks, which in turn is linear in the size
of the window time); 4) Proposition 5.6 (Complexity of T tQoS is linear in the size of the
window t); and 5) the fact that those functions are computed independently one from the
other. 
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Proposition 5.8. ptw,CO can be computed in time O(|t|.|C |), which means linear in both the
size of the window t and the size of the community C .
Proof. From Proposition 5.1, Reptw can be computed in O(|t|). Consequently, the function
∑k∈C Rep
t
k can be computed in O(|t|.|C |), so it does the computation of the function CL
t
w




). Thus, from Equation 5.10, the result follows. 
5.5.2 Coopetition Threshold
In this part, we compute the coopetition threshold that a typical service agent could use to
adopt reasonable interacting strategies and we empirically verify the effectiveness of the
obtained results in the next section. In fact, to decide which strategy to adopt, we let the
service agent w compare its growth factor Gtw with the coopetition threshold τ
t
w it holds
at current window time t and choose to compete with probability Ptw that we compute in




















The key factor in the computation of the probability Ptw and the associated utility is
the threshold value. To compute the threshold, we use the game-theoretic best response
technique. A typical service agent w will follow the best response strategy to maximize its
expected aggregated payoff. The idea is to equalize the expected payoffs of the two acting
strategies: compete and cooperate. The objective behind equalizing payoffs is to explore
conditions under which service agent w could react with best response to further decision
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making procedures. We use the obtained conditions to compute the threshold τ tw during the






































From which, we derive:
COF tw = µw,CM−
ptw,CO µw,CO
ptw,CM
Replacing ptw,CM and p
t
w,CO using Equations 5.9 and 5.10, we derive the following:















By simplifying the sinus function from both the numerator and denominator sides and sub-
stituting the cooperation factorCLtw of service w we obtain Equation 5.13:















Equation 5.13 computes the cooperation feeCOF tw that is assigned by service w. This
fee represents the amount that w spends to cooperate with other service(s) to accomplish
the task. By so doing, we obtain the maximum amount of cooperation fee that service w
can use to constrain the positive payoff out of competing. Otherwise, the service stays as
cooperative entity.
Proposition 5.9. COF tw can be computed in time O(|t|.|C |), which means linear in both the
size of the window t and the size of the community C .
Proof. From Proposition 5.1, Reptw can be computed in O(|t|). Consequently, the function
∑k∈C Rep
t




QoS can be computed in time
O(t) (from the second part of Equation 5.4 and Proposition 5.6 respectively), we are done.

Lemma 5.1. The competition payoff pitw,CM can be computed in time O(|t|.|C |).
Proof. The result follows directly from Propositions 5.3, 5.4, 5.7, and 5.9. 
Lemma 5.2. The cooperation payoff pitw,CO can be computed in time O(|t|.|C |).
Proof. The result follows directly from Propositions 5.4, 5.5, and 5.8. 
We use the maximum cooperation fee that a service agent considers to constrain the
positive expected payoff when the competitive strategy is adopted to update the threshold
for the consequent time window (t+ 1). We compare the maximum cooperation fee with
the required fee (ReqF tw) that the service indicates to accomplish the task. The outcome
of this comparison is a factor that uses the current threshold τ tw to compute the consequent
threshold τ t+1w . As in online learning, the idea is to compute iteratively the threshold until
the fixed point is achieved, which indicates the threshold’s conversion, where the initial
value is randomly chosen (in the simulation different initial values are used). Equation 5.14
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shows this computation. To investigate the effectiveness of this threshold on the outcomes
of the services that follow this reasoning technique, in the next section, we compare the




Θ if 0≤Θ≤ 1
1 if Θ > 1;
0 if Θ < 0.
(5.14)
Θ = τ tw
COF tw
ReqF tw
Proposition 5.10. The threshold τ tw can be computed in time O(|t|.|C |), which means linear
in both the size of the window t and the size of the community C .
Proof. From Equation 5.14, the computation of τ tw is recursive on t, and the algorithm
works by keeping the last computed value in a variable, which saves the time of re-calculation.
Thus, the complexity of calculating τ tw is determined by the complexity of calculatingCOF
t
w
since ReqF tw is constant during the period t. Consequently, the result follows from Proposi-
tion 5.9. 
Theorem 5.3. The time complexity of the proposed decision mechanism is O(|t|.|C |), which
means linear in both the size of the window t and the size of the community C .
Proof. The procedure mechanism is based on comparing the growth factor Gtw with the
coopetition threshold τ tw as shown in Equations 5.11 and 5.12. Thus, the result follows
from Propositions 5.2 and 5.10. 
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5.6 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis over the theoretical results regarding the
characteristics of intelligent service agents hosted in different communities of services. In
the implemented system, we simulate the behaviors of service consumers as request gen-
erators, service agents as service providers, and master agents as community representa-
tives. The objective is to investigate the effectiveness of the proposed strategic system
on intelligent services’ overall budget and also the average quality and quantity of tasks
performed by the community of services, which directly affects user satisfaction. To verify
these objectives, we study the overall performance of the community hosting the reasoning-
empowered services compared to the ones hosting stochastic and purely competitive ser-
vices. By stochastic services, we mean services that adopt at each moment competitive or
cooperative strategies in an equally but random way. By equally, we mean the choices are
fairly divided between the two strategies.
The simulation application is written in C# using Visual Studio. We performed the
implementation on a single Intel Xeon X3450 machine with 6GBs of memory. Web ser-
vices were modeled as a class and using Await and Async models we initiated many web
services, each running as a thread. We implemented XML based messaging system (like
SOAP) with request parameters and a list of XML based responses. The request contains
the flight dates, the origin and destination, type of tickets, and number of guests. The re-
sponse contains different flights with different companies, prices, timing, etc. A pool of
services are initialized with values taken from a real dataset that includes 2507 real ser-
vices functioning on the web. The dataset records the QoS values of 9 parameters including
availability, throughput, and reliability [1].
We start our discussions with cumulative budget comparison regarding different com-
munities within which services follow different reasoning techniques. Figure 5.3 part (a)
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Figure 5.3: Part (a): Cumulative community budget comparison. Part (b): Average com-
munity reputation comparison over different strategic decisions.
illustrates three graphs for three different communities. Each community hosts services
that follow different reasoning techniques: (1) a community that follows the interactive rea-
soning techniques presented in this report (referred to as coopetitive); (2) a community that
follows a stochastic reasoning technique so decisions about selecting competitive or cooper-
ative strategies are totally random (referred to as random coopetitive); and (3) a competitive
community where all services follow the competitive strategy (referred to as competitive).
The results illustrated in Figure 5.3 part (a) verify the importance of the strategic de-
cision making procedure to logically decide over the possible competitive and cooperative
choices. Figure 5.3 part (b) illustrates communities average reputation of involved services.
The graphs represent the influence of the rewards that the master agent uses to encourage
highly capable services to compete for a task. As for the cumulative budget, we observe
that the coopetitive community outperforms the random coopetitive and competitive com-
munities in terms of average reputation. The proposed model’s average reputation increases
because services follow optimal strategies where they can perform better so obtain higher
rewards. For the same reasons as for the cumulative budget, the average reputation of the
random coopetitive community outperforms the one of the competitive community.
In our model, services are managed by selfish agents in the sense they try to maximize
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Figure 5.4: Overall performance from community’s point of view. Part (a) Total number of
tasks successfully done. Part (b) Ratio of tasks satisfied with required QoS. Part (c) Average
QoS of performed tasks.
their own utilities. We analyze how their strategies affect the social welfare, and from user’s
and community’s point of view how good the tasks are being performed. This directly
impacts user’s satisfaction and community’s reputation in general. The Higher quality and
quantity of tasks performed leads to higher user’s satisfaction for the community which
results in better reputation for the community. The results in Figure 5.4 show the quality and
quantity of tasks being done successfully in three communities adopting the three different
aforementioned strategy decision algorithms. As clearly confirmed by the simulation, the
coopetitive community outperforms the stochastic and compete communities.
We conclude our analysis by discussing how effective our coopetitive decision mak-
ing model is by comparing the final utility (in terms of income) of services following our
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model with other services deviating from that coopetitive model. In Figure 5.5 Part (a),
we made the services deviate from the suggested strategy. As the simulation shows, the
more services deviate from our coopetitive strategy the more they make less benefits. In
Part (b), we pick one random service and simulate the scenario with its default coopetitive
strategy and then we redo the simulation with exactly the same environment parameters
while gradually alternating the decisions. By alternating we mean adapting the opposite
of what our model does suggest. Thus, if the coopetitive model suggests to compete, the
service agent will cooperate and vice versa. We run this scenario 50 times and at the end we
check the service’s budget and see if it gains more by deviating or not. We did this for one
single deviation (i.e., alternating only one decision) to 10 different deviations (alternating
10 different decisions) during the 50 times run. As the results show, deviating from the
coopetitive strategy yields less income for the service.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we addressed the research questions R6 that was introduced in section 1.3.
We proposed a game-theoretic based model to analyze the efficiency characteristics for
the active services in open networks. The proposed framework considers the chances of
web services in joining a community in different cases with truthful and lying information
service agents. The proposed game analyzes the existing Nash equilibrium and situations
where the maximum payoff is obtained.
Our model has the advantage of being simple and taking into account three impor-
tant factors: (1) rational web services seek better status in the environment by joining the
community; (2) rational web services obtain higher payoff by truth telling; and (3) the com-
munity is obtaining more effective web services. These advantages are confirmed through
the conducted simulations.
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Figure 5.5: Utility loss while deviating from our coopetitive decision process. Part (a)
Overall budget when deviating from our model in 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 percent of deci-
sions. Part (b) Ratio of getting earning utility (budget) when deviating from our coopetitive
strategy in 1 to 10 decisions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed three models for aggregation of web services within communi-
ties. The goal of our models are to maximize efficiency by collaborating and forming stable
communities. In our first contribution, we focused on stability and fairness for all web
services within the communities. In this work, we addressed the shortcomings of commu-
nity formation in recent work such as considering best strategies which benefit all services
involved, making solutions practical in real-time settings and taking into account the fair-
ness and stability of communities. The proposed model offers an applicable mechanism for
membership requests and selection of web services. The ultimate goal is to increase revenue
by improving user satisfaction, which comes from the ability to perform more tasks with
high quality. The theoretical and extensive simulation results show that our algorithms pro-
vide web services and community owners, in real-world-like environments, with applicable
and near-optimal decision making mechanisms.
In our next step of research work, we proposed DDM, a strategic distributed deci-
sion making mechanism that regulates the community formation process and membership
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management in communities of web services. In this work, we tried to tackle the issue of
autonomous web services not having a centralized architecture and complete information
of all the parameters of other web services. The proposed mechanism helps web services
and communities decide with whom to be grouped and cooperate. DDM first generates a
trained set of data based on information obtained from large number of web services re-
garding their single and cooperative utilities as well as environmental parameters such as
demand, service quality, etc. Communities and web services can use the trained model
and instantly choose best-response strategies considering their long-term gain. In fact, the
decision making mechanism is implemented as a decision tree of possible viable strategies
along with their long-term expected utility. The ultimate goal of our mechanism is to make
a better decision when it comes to community formation, which goes beyond short-term
utility increasing choices, usually considered in the literature. We performed experiments
using real date from 142 users on 4,532 web services during 64 different time slots. The
experimental results show that our approach allows web services and communities, in real-
world-like environments, to make near-perfect decisions. Moreover, the experiments using
real data samples support the need for a long-term training model in a successful decision
making process.
In our final step of the work, the focus was on inter-community interaction between
services involved within the community. The contribution of this model is the proposition of
a coopetitive strategic model to analyze the interacting behavior of intelligent services that
are active within communities. We considered two acting strategies where service agents
expect different sort of payoffs: (1) competitive strategy where the service claims that it
can accomplish a task and therefore can take the responsibility over the service consumer
satisfaction; and (2) cooperative strategy where the service does not take the responsibility
to accomplish the task and only cooperates with competitive peers. Our proposed model
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advances the state-of-the-art in cooperative systems by enabling intelligent agent-based ser-
vices to effectively choose their interacting strategies that lead to optimal outcomes. The
proposed framework provides a reasoning technique that service agents can use to increase
their overall obtained utilities. The theoretical results presented in this thesis are also backed
by simulation results using a real services dataset. Moreover, we conducted extensive sim-
ulations, analyzed various scenarios, and confirmed the obtained theoretical results using
parameters from a real services dataset on the web. Those results showed that our model
outperforms existing competitive and random coopetitive strategies and the more services
deviate from the coopetitive strategy suggested by our decision-making mechanism the less
benefits they make.
This work has twomain limitations. The first one is on the business side of the project.
The concept of communities is still theoretical and more efforts need to be done to convince
different web service providers, particularly major web service market players, to imple-
ment this concept and join different communities. However, as any new business model,
once the concept of communities is commercialized and the benefits are clear for different
providers, they will have enough incentive to join the communities. The other limitation is
on the implementation side, more precisely the difficulty to extract real information about
some quality metrics of web services and their communities. Communities of web services
have not been implemented yet in large scale and real-world settings. Therefore, we had to
estimate their parameters in various cases. A real-world data-set extracted from large scale
online communities will help improve our results.
6.2 Future Work
As future work, for the community formation in our first model, we would like to per-
form more analytical and theoretical analysis on the convexity condition and also minimal
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ε values in ε-core solution concepts based on the characteristic function in web service
applications. From web service perspective, the work can be extended to consider web ser-
vices compositions where a group of web services having different set of skills cooperate to
perform composite tasks. Also bargaining theory from cooperative game theory concepts
[82] can be used to help web services resolve the instability and unfairness issues by side
payments.
For the distributed model, our future plan is to advance further the learning process on
the training set we provided in our work by leveraging some game theoretical approaches.
Hedonic games and fractional hedonic games [19, 10] are of particular interest where the
utility of a player in a community depends on the identity of the other members of the
community and the value this player ascribes to those members. We intent to investigate
stability solution concepts such as Shapley value so that long-term decisions will be based
on the probability that the community will last for long period. The SVM machine learning
algorithm [65, 24] is suitable for classification of our training data set to better distinguish
decisions based on long-term utility, as data set outputs. This can further facilitate the
process of finding optimal cooperators which will result in enhancing web services’ overall
performance as service providers.
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